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Abstract 
In this study, we examine the options market reaction to bank loan announcements for the population 
of US firms with traded options and loan announcements during 1996-2010. We get evidence on a 
significant options market reaction to bank loan announcements in terms of levels and changes in 
short-term implied volatility and its term structure, and observe significant decreases in short-term 
implied volatility, and significant increases in the slope of its term structure as a result of loan 
announcements. Our findings appear to be more pronounced for firms with more information 
asymmetry, lower credit ratings and loans with longer maturities and higher spreads. Evidence is 
consistent with loan announcements providing reassurance for investors in the short-term, however, 
over longer time horizons, the increase in the TSIV slope indicates that investors become increasingly 
unsure over the potential risks of loan repayment or uses of the proceeds. 
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1. Introduction 
Past research has provided evidence that bank loans are somewhat ‘special’ in comparison to bonds or 
other types of financing, in the sense that they have been associated with positive, rather than 
negative, stock market reaction to relevant announcements (see James, 1987; Mikkelson and Partch, 
1986; Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Slovin et al., 1992; Best and Zhang, 1993; Billett et al., 1995; 
Preece and Mullineaux, 1994), in contrast to other types of financing e.g. bonds (James, 1987; Eckbo 
et al., 2007). This positive market reaction to bank loan announcements has been attributed to banks 
serving a monitoring, as well as an ‘information-asymmetry-mitigating’ role (Fields et al., 2006), 
providing certification that the firm receiving the loan was able to convince the bank to grant this 
funding (Cook et al., 2003). However, another stream of research has criticized the validity of the 
results of such event studies, mainly in relation to the limited number of loans being actually 
announced in press (Gonzalez, 2011), which has been considered to be non-representative of the 
overall population of firms obtaining bank loans, implying that if all loans were to be announced, no 
significant market performance should be observed (Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011a). In a similar 
vein, other research has observed that positive market appraisal of loan announcements has 
diminished in recent years (Fields et al., 2006), with this being more pronounced for firms with higher 
levels of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, that is, for example, for smaller, but 
not larger firms (Fields et al., 2006, and Slovin et al., 1992, in accordance with Diamond’s 1991 
hypothesis). 
In this paper, we examine the option market reaction to bank loan announcements made by North 
American listed firms during 1996-2010. Past research has not reached a unanimous conclusion about 
whether bank loan announcement are indeed ‘special’ by producing a significantly positive reaction 
by market participants. This is because on one hand, a significant number of studies have provided 
evidence consistent with such a conclusion, but on the other hand, Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) 
and Fields et al. (2006, for more recent loans) have provided evidence that bank loan announcements 
are not actually different with respect to producing a positive stock market reaction, while the same 
research has distinguished between firms exhibiting larger as opposed to lower levels of information 
asymmetry, suggesting that the latter group of firms does not experience such significant stock market 
returns (Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011a). In that sense, we examine whether options markets 
significantly react to bank loan announcements, given that firms traded in option markets should be 
expected to be on average larger, and are therefore assumed to face less information asymmetry. 
Regarding, however, market reaction and price discovery, a number of studies have reached the 
conclusion that option markets actually lead stock markets (Ansi and Ouda, 2009), with the most 
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sophisticated and informed traders trading in the options markets, rather than in the stock markets 
(Xing et al., 2010; Diavatopoulos et al., 2012; Jin et al., 2012; Goodman et al., 2012).  
In that respect, this study examines the reaction to bank loan announcements for the market which has 
been considered to be more informationally sophisticated. We focus on firms which should be 
expected to face the least information asymmetry, from the moment they have equity securities traded 
in the stock market as well as option contracts traded in options markets, so they should be expected 
to represent the subsample of the population of stock market traded firms most ‘in the limelight.’ In 
the process of this examination, we employ for the first time the entire population of firms in 
Compustat-CRSP-Optionmetrics, manually track whether their bank loans have been announced, and 
provide real, rather than inferred evidence, on the option market reaction to loans announced from this 
entire population.  
Volatility implied from equity option contracts (hereafter IV) represents today’s market assessment of 
future volatility, and is widely considered a forward-looking measure of investor expectations about 
the risk and future economic performance of firms. At the same time, observed option prices can be 
used by market participants to infer volatility expectations over different time horizons, providing a 
reflection of the market's assessment of the uncertainty over different time horizons (Campa and 
Chang, 1995). This ‘term structure’ of implied volatilities (hereafter, TSIV) from equity options 
should be reflective of long or medium-term (relative to short-term) uncertainty expectations of 
market participants with respect to the underlying stock return. TSIV is expected to be reflective of 
the market’s assessment of long-term vs. short-term uncertainty over the future economic 
performance of underlying firms, and thus we explicitly examine the path followed by the TSIV 
around bank loan announcements. A steeper (flatter) TSIV curve implies a stronger (weaker) 
deviation of short-term in comparison to long term implied volatility. In the same direction, a positive 
(negative) change in the slope of the TSIV around earnings announcements implies that investors are 
becoming increasingly unsure about the relative level of long-term (short-term) equity volatility. 
We therefore examine the option market reaction to bank loan announcements by assessing short-term 
IV (using option contracts with 30 days to maturity) levels and changes, as well as the level and 
change in the TSIV around announcements. We expect that in case bank loan announcements are 
indeed value-relevant, this should translate in a statistically and economically significant relation 
between such events and the levels and changes of short-term IV and TSIV around the event. At this 
point, a key difference between stock and option markets is that the former produced directional 
reactions (i.e. positive or negative stock returns) while the latter responds to news through changes in 
implied volatility (with resulting changes in the prices of option contracts), indicating that traders 
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become increasingly or decreasingly sure on the future prospects of firms over different time 
horizons. At the same time, bank loan announcements are not, by their nature, fully-expected events 
on a periodic basis by investors, as is the case with earnings announcements, with a corresponding 
question about the extent to which market participants incorporate news about them in their trading. 
In case option investors consider that securing bank loan financing provides reassurance and 
certification for borrowing firms, and this event is fully anticipated, we should observe decreases in 
IV, at least in the short-run, around, and especially, following such announcements. However, if 
options market traders consider that imminent loan announcements may result in material changes in 
their assessment of future cash flow generation and downside risk by borrowing firms, but they are 
not fully anticipated by option market participants, we should expect increases in short-term IV before 
loan announcements, and possible decreases after the event, in case investors have received some 
reassurance. This would resemble the pattern of implied volatility behavior observed around corporate 
earnings announcements (referring to an increase or ‘run-up’ in IV before the event, and decrease or 
‘run-down’ after the event has taken place; Whaley and Cheung 1982; Donders and Vorst 1996; 
Dubinsky and Johannes 2005; Truong et al., 2012).  
Regarding the effect of the above expectations on the slope and changes in the TSIV, the short-term 
end of the curve should be mechanically affected given any possible changes in short-term IV around 
loan announcements.  However, as new bank loans would affect the long-term financial position of 
the firm, with respect to the materialization of possible investment opportunities funded with the 
loans, or the ability of the borrowing firm to service its debt efficiently in the future, we expect that 
loan announcements convey material information which should be expected to influence the long-
term risk and uncertainty profile of the borrowing firm. In this respect, any decrease in the slope of 
the TSIV after loan announcements would imply that investors become more reassured and consider 
that long vs. short-term uncertainty has decreased given the certification benefits obtained by the loan, 
whereas an eventual increase in the TSIV slope, would imply that option market investors become 
more uncertain over the longer-term prospects of the firm and related downside potential, as a result 
of the granted bank loan. We consider the second possibility for option market reaction to be more 
plausible than the first one, given that imminent bank loans are indeed expected to change the risk 
profile of firms and corresponding future ability to repay debt in the future to a greater extent 
compared to certification benefits granted to the borrower through the bank loan process.  
By using the entire population or universe of loans from Dealscan that are issued to firms with 
accounting data on Compustat and options data on Optionmetrics during 1996-2010, we first find that 
around 42% of loan facilities (corresponding to a lower number of deals) are overall announced either 
by the firm itself (22.4%) or by parties other than the firm (19.5%), for example, the bank which 
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grants the loan or the press in general, by searching for such announcements in the Lexis/Nexis 
database. To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes for the first time evidence on actual numbers 
of loans being announced, using the entire population rather than sampling techniques (Maskara and 
Mullineaux, 2011a, and Gonzalez, 2011).  
Using a standard ‘event study’ methodology, we examine the statistical significance of IV and TSIV 
levels and changes for at-the-money equity options around bank loan announcements (1 and 10-day 
windows), and our evidence first points towards a significantly positive level of short-term IV and a 
significantly negative slope in TSIV (a mechanical result of high short-term IV) on the day of the loan 
announcement, consistent with short-term IV being exceptionally high on the day of loan 
announcements, as is the case with earnings announcements (Truong et al., 2012). Our evidence is 
further consistent with a significant decrease in short-term IV around (imminently before as well as 
after) loan announcements, and a significant increase in the slope of the TSIV around the event, with 
this evidence to be confirmed in the case of the ten-day window around the event. To the extent that 
this time window allows us to examine the overall effect of the announcement on IV by insulating this 
examination from any short-term market microstructure issues centered around the event day, this 
evidence is considered to be consistent with loan announcements providing a certain amount of 
reassurance for investors in the short-term, however, over longer time horizons, the increase in the 
TSIV slope indicates that investors become increasingly unsure over borrowing firm prospects in the 
long-run. At the same time, we get evidence on a significant increase in short-term IV from ten days 
before up to the day of the event, consistent with option market traders expecting that the imminent 
announcement should contain relevant information, and our evidence further indicates that all relevant 
information has been incorporated within options pricing at least one day before the event.  
Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) conjecture that loan announcements by parties other than the firm 
may be more likely related to information asymmetries, compared to loans announced by firms 
themselves. In this context, the above analysis was performed both for loans announced by firms 
themselves as well as for loans announced by any party, with results to have remained qualitatively 
similar. We then repeat our analysis for loans of different credit ratings (speculative, investment 
grade, or unrated), maturity (shorter or longer than two years), spread size (lower/higher than 150 
basis points (bp)), and level of firm information asymmetry (using the methodology proposed by 
Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011a, for information asymmetry assessment). Our findings on IV and 
TSIV dynamics appear to be more pronounced for firms with more information asymmetry, lower 
credit ratings–or no credit rating–as well as loans with longer maturities and higher spreads. These 
results are consistent with a stronger reaction of option markets to the loans which are more likely 
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accompanied by a greater degree of uncertainty, greater difficulty in making accurate predictions 
about future firm performance and possibly resulting in increased downside risk.  
Furthermore, we examine which firm-specific and loan-specific factors most significantly relate to the 
reaction of option markets to loan announcements. Our analysis, that explicitly accounts for the 
inherent self-selection of firms announcing their new loan issues (self-selection bias, Heckman, 1979), 
identifies a considerable number of firm and loan-specific factors significantly relating to the level 
and changes of short-term IV and TSIV. More specifically, we find that option markets react more 
strongly to announcements by smaller firms, and by firms with lower profitability, higher historical 
cash flow volatility and leverage ratios, while this reaction further depends on loan size and number of 
lenders. This evidence is consistent with option markets reacting more sensitively to loans possibly 
creating stronger material changes to the firm, in accordance with Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a), 
referring to loans requiring a larger lender base (to the extent that a larger number of lenders provides 
more efficient diversification, Preece and Mullineaux, 1994), and loans of firms with fundamental 
attributes which could be intuitively considered to be more risky, such as small size or high cash flow 
volatility. We consider this evidence to constitute a significant degree of option market efficiency, 
especially since stock markets have not been observed to exhibit relevant sensitivity to such an extent 
(Byers et al., 2008). 
Finally, given our findings of statistically significant decreases (increases) of short-term equity option 
implied volatility (implied volatility term structure) following firm loan announcements, we move to 
explore whether these observed dynamics are economically exploitable, by implementing a (self-
financed) option trading strategy that yields statistically significant profits in-sample. The strategy is 
implemented by ‘going long’ the equity volatility term structure of firms announcing new loan 
facilities (via at-the-money straddles with the longest available time to maturity), it is self-financed (in 
that the long positions are sustained by ‘going short’ the necessary number of at-the-money straddles 
with the shortest available expiry) and it yields—in the absence of transaction costs—a statistically 
significant average return of 1.66% on the (self-financed) average position size of $500. Although the 
profits of our trading strategy are diminished by transactions costs and are well-within the bid-ask 
spreads that an investor in the option market would face, the results of our trading exercise 
undoubtedly establish the economic (in addition to the statistical) significance of the option market 
reaction, as manifested by implied volatility, to loan announcements.   
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First and foremost, this is the first study 
that examines the option market reaction to loan announcements made by firms. Secondly and equally 
importantly, our study bases its entire analysis on all loan announcements (manually-collected from 
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Lexis/Nexis) made by all firms with data on Compustat and Optionmetrics and bank loan data on 
Dealscan. 
Previous studies (e.g. Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011a; Gonzalez, 2011) have examined the stock 
market reaction to firm loan announcements, by first using random sampling techniques in order to 
construct a representative sample of loans from the Dealscan database, and then by estimating 
abnormal stock returns for the subsample of loan deals that were actually announced. The reaction of 
the options market, although it has been shown to lead the stock market in several respects (e.g. price 
discovery, see the review by Ansi and Ouda, 2009), has been neglected by previous research, and our 
study fills this gap by establishing that there are statistically significant decreases of short-term 
implied volatility, and significant increases in the slope of the implied volatility term structure around 
the loan announcement day. These findings appear more pronounced for loans by firms which could 
be considered to be facing more information asymmetries or possess fundamental characteristics 
traditionally linked to greater risk e.g. smaller size, or cash flow volatility, and are consistent with the 
view that loan announcements provide reassurance for investors in the short-term (due to the 
monitoring role that loan issuing banks can play); however, over longer time horizons, the increase in 
the slope of implied volatility term structure would indicate that investors become increasingly unsure 
over borrowing firm prospects in the long-run.  
Our findings on the options market reaction to firm loan announcements are unique and assertive: 
they are based on the entire population of such announcements by listed firms with options traded on 
their common stock during 1996-2010, accomplishing a level of assertion that cannot be obtained to a 
comparable extent by the frequently-used population sampling techniques of related studies 
examining the reaction to loan announcements. Finally, we indirectly contribute to the debate on the 
nature of firm loan announcements by establishing that, for the options market, such announcements 
are indeed economically significant and exploitable, through a profitable trading strategy that is based 
on our main findings. 
The rest of paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the sample selection process and the 
methodology for the estimation of the options market reaction. Section 3 reports our empirical 
findings, while Section 4 summarizes the results of a self-financed option trading strategy that is 
motivated by our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Sample selection and methodology 
2.1 Sample selection 
We begin our analysis by matching firms from Compustat with common stocks traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ to firms that have equity options data on the Ivy DB OptionMetrics database 
between 1996 and 2010 (excluding firms in the financial and government sectors, i.e. with SICs in the 
6000s and 9000s), and this matching process yields 4,798 individual firms.
4
 We then retrieve data on 
loan deals and facilities from LPC’s Dealscan database for North American firms (regardless of date 
each facility was active) and this process yields 133,950 different loan facilities.
5
 Dealscan reports 
data on a variety of bank loan contract terms, referring to different deals, which may include one or 
several loan facilities. All data on loan contract terms are reported at the facility level, and following 
past research (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Kim et al., 2011; Ferreira and Matos, 2012), all our empirical 
analysis is performed at the facility level.
6
  
As the only common identifier between Compustat and Dealscan is firm ticker, in accordance with 
past research (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Ferreira and Matos, 2012, Hasan et al., 
2012), we merge the 4,798 firms obtained from the Compustat/Optionmetrics matching with 
Dealscan; this merging is performed first by firm name and then by firm ticker, followed by a manual 
control of the obtained results.
7
 This way, in essence, the matching between the databases is 
performed mainly by name, with a significant part of this process to represent hand matching. At this 
point, Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) mention that they exclude observations from Dealscan 
without a ticker symbol (Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011a, p. 686). However, this would result in 
excluding a great number of firm loans simply because Dealscan does not report ticker data on them, 
and which are also in practice recycled (Hasan et al., 2012–making manual confirmation of the 
matching performed according to them absolutely necessary), which justifies performing matching by 
                                                          
4
  January 1996 is the first month for which options data are available on Ivy DB OptionMetrics. 
5
  Data download from Dealscan as of February 2012.  
6
  We follow the aforementioned studies and consider each facility to be a separate observation for the sample, 
given loan characteristics as well as loan spreads may very well vary across facilities (Kim et al., 2011, pp. 
1,166 and footnote 15). At this point, Billet et al. (2011) mention that each of their events represents a deal, 
rather than a facility (footnote 3) and Cook et al. (2003) make use of only the facility listed first in each of the 
deals, but find no material difference in their results if they not control for multiple facilities with the same 
borrower–lender combinations (footnote 21). However, different facilities corresponding to the same deal may 
possess different loan characteristics (e.g. different maturities for different tranches of the deal), so we follow 
from previous research focusing the analysis on the facility level, while we address this issue by making use of 
standard errors clustered at the firm level in all regression analysis that follows (Graham et al., 2008; Petersen 
2009; Gow et al. 2010; Kim et al., 2011). On several instances, the expressions ‘loan facility’ and ‘loan’ are 
used in text without distinction, by making reference to loan facilities each time.  
7
 In cases where a number of different borrowers were mentioned for a particular facility in Dealscan, matching 
with Compustat firms was performed for the borrowing firm which was mentioned first.   
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name in addition to ticker between Dealscan and accounting data databases, as has been done by 
previous studies (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009).  
This matching process results in a total of 2,221 different firms (after 1996) corresponding in a total 
of 12,928 different loan facilities, for which the rest of the data used in the study is data-dependent. 
Finally, for these firms, stock returns, when necessary in the analysis, have been retrieved from CRSP 
and data on analysts’ forecasts from IBES. Detailed definitions for all variables employed in the study 
are provided in Appendix A.  
The next step in our sample collection was to manually search in the Lexis/Nexis database (also 
employed by past research, e.g. Fields et al., 2006; Byers et al, 2008; Ongena and Roskovan, 2009) in 
order to investigate which of these 12,928 facilities were announced. In accordance with Fields et al. 
(2006, pp. 1 and 198) we search Lexis/Nexis for the terms ‘bank loan’, or ‘line of credit’, or ‘credit 
agreement’, or ‘credit facility’.8 In accordance with the time window employed by Maskara and 
Mullineaux (2011a), we search for an announcement in a period ranging from six months before until 
two months after the loan facility active date, with the vast the majority of our identified loan 
announcements to take place in a window of +/- 15 days around the facility active date (confirming 
Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011a, at this point). 
In accordance with past research (e.g. Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011a) that hypothesizes in favour of 
different information asymmetry levels depending on the actual source of loan announcements, we 
distinguish between identified loan announcements made by either the borrowing firm, the lending 
bank or another identified source in the press (which is neither the firm nor the bank). Out of our 
12,928 facilities, 42% (5,422 out of 12,928 loan tranches or facilities, corresponding to a lower 
number of deals) are announced by the firm itself (22.4%) or by parties other than the firm (19.5%), 
for example, the bank which grants the loan or the press in general.
9
 The observed percentages of 
loans being announced generally provide support for the numbers reported in Gonzalez (2011) –22%–
and Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) –a little more than 25%–using randomly selected samples.   
It should be mentioned at this point that in accordance with previous research (Billett et al., 2006; 
Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011a; Maskara and Mullineaux 2011b; Billett et al., 2011; Gande and 
Saunders, 2012), we make use of LCP’s Dealscan Database, which is dominated by syndicated loans. 
                                                          
8
 More specifically, a so-called ‘power search’ according to company name was performed in Lexis/Nexis, by 
indicating that the desired level of relevance is ‘strong’.  
9
 In case we find an announcement mentioning that ‘a borrower is either seeking the loan or expecting to 
receive the loan or that a lead bank is inviting syndicate members to participate in a loan’ as stated by Maskara 
and Mullineaux (2011a, p. 686), we then consider that an announcement is indeed made, even if the loan is not 
considered finalised or a ‘done deal’. Nevertheless, from the moment a certain amount of publicity pre-exists 
about a loan that is subsequently concluded (and thus appears in Dealscan), we do classify it as announced. 
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More specifically, we observe that 12,104–or 93.6%–out of the 12,928 (announced and unannounced) 
loan facilities included in our sample state ‘Syndication’ as their loan Distribution Method, while 
more than one lenders are reported for 11,092 tranches. Syndicated loans have been considered to be 
providing a form of debt financing falling between bank financing and bond financing (Maskara and 
Mullineaux, 2011b), combining elements of both commercial banking and investment banking at the 
same time (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). Such loans are provided to a single borrower by multiple 
financial institutions, which form a 'syndicate' for that purpose, and therefore allow credit risk sharing 
among syndicate members, without the disclosure and marketing issues that bond issuers face. 
Although syndicated loans represent a hybrid form of lending, having commonalities with bank loans 
and public debt, they are considered to be closer to the former because of the role of the lead arranger, 
who is expected to formulate the loan terms and conditions and monitor the borrower and who usually 
holds the largest share of the loan (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007). In this respect, Ivashina 
(2005) finds that syndicated loans are overall cheaper than loans with a single lender loans, Angbazo 
et al. (1998) find that syndicated loans have lower spreads, while Maskara (2010) observes that 
syndicated loans with multiple tranches have lower rates than non-tranched loans which have 
otherwise similar characteristics.
10
 Nevertheless, we consider that despite the fact that our sample is 
dominated by syndicated loans, the examination of this sample may provide representative results on 
the reaction of the option market to bank loan announcements, in the context of past research making 
use of the universe of Dealscan data in order to examine the market reaction to such loans (Maskara 
and Mullineaux, 2011a, among others).
11
  
2.2 Methodology for the estimation of short-term implied volatility and implied volatility term 
structure  
We use the volatility implied from equity options as a proxy for market participant’s forward-looking 
view of uncertainty regarding the underlying stock. Estimates of implied volatility are readily 
available on a daily basis from the OptionMetrics Standardized Options dataset, for both calls and 
puts that are closest-to-the-money, with maturities ranging from 30 days to 730 days.  
As in previous research, we focus on the closest-to-maturity, at-the-money implied volatility (that is 
the quickest to respond to releases of new information, see for example Truong et al., 2012; Donders 
                                                          
10
 For a detailed description of loan syndication, see also Maskara and Mullineaux (2011b).  
11
 Maskara and Mullineaux (2011b), using data from Dealscan, mention that non-syndicated loans are 
significantly smaller than those that are syndicated, with Dealscan reporting roughly equal number of bank loans 
and syndicated loans, at least during their 1985–1999 sample period. (footnote 3). We consider that the greater 
representation of syndicated loans in our sample may also stem from the fact that the 12,928 tranches 
representing the sample of firms with data on Compustat and Optionmetrics matched with loan data from 
Dealscan may very well represent larger than average firms from Dealscan.  
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et al., 2000 and also Goodman et al., 2012; Goyal and Seratto, 2009), to gauge the equity options 
market reaction to loan announcements. In order to demonstrate the estimation of our short-term 
implied volatility (IV) and implied volatility term structure (TSIV) measures, let 𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑐  (respectively 
𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑝
) stands for the firm 𝑖 equity volatility, as implied from the closest-to-the-money call option 
(respectively put option) with maturity 𝑇𝑗 (in years) on (relative) day 𝜏. Relative day 𝜏 should be 
understood as follows: As we are only interested in the implied volatility (and its term structure) 
around loan announcement dates, our day indexing 𝜏 takes values [−10, −9, … , +10] relative to the 
firm 𝑖 loan announcement day (day 𝜏 = 0). Moreover, let 𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑎 = 0.5(𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑐 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑝 )  stand for the 
simple (call-put) average implied volatility on day 𝜏, and 
𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑐 × |𝛥𝑗,𝜏
𝑐 − 0.50| + 𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑝 × |𝛥𝑗,𝜏
𝑝 − 0.50|
|𝛥𝑗,𝜏
𝑐 − |𝛥𝑗,𝜏
𝑝
||
                                   (1) 
for the delta-interpolated (call-put) average implied volatility on day 𝜏, with 𝛥𝑗,𝜏
𝑐 , 𝛥𝑗,𝜏
𝑝
 the call and put 
deltas respectively (see Truong et al., 2012 and  Mixon, 2009 inter alia for the use of the average and 
delta-interpolated implied volatility in empirical studies). Finally, for each sample firm 𝑖, on day 𝜏 
relative to its loan announcement day, the following proxies for the implied volatility term structure 
(TSIV) are also estimated through ordinary least squares: 
𝜎𝑖,𝑗,𝜏
𝑞 = 𝛼𝑖,𝜏
𝑞 + 𝛽𝑖,𝜏
𝑞 × 𝛵𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖,𝜏
𝑞 ,          𝑞 = {𝑐, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑖𝑛𝑡}                      (2) 
The (call, put, average and delta-interpolated) implied volatilities that are available on day 𝜏 are 
regressed on their contract expiries 𝛵𝑗 (expressed in years), and the simple OLS slopes ?̂?𝑖,𝜏
𝑞
 are used as 
proxies of the implied volatility term structure for firm 𝑖 on day 𝜏. 
Throughout the paper, we report empirical results using the delta-interpolated 𝜎𝑖,𝜏
𝑖𝑛𝑡 ≡ 𝜎𝑖,𝜏 and 
?̂?𝑖,𝜏
𝑖𝑛𝑡 ≡ 𝛽𝑖,𝜏 as our base-case implied volatility and term structure proxies, and employ 𝜎𝑖,𝜏
𝑐 , 𝜎𝑖,𝜏
𝑝 , 𝜎𝑖,𝜏
𝑎  
and 𝛽𝑖,𝜏
𝑐 , 𝛽𝑖,𝜏
𝑝 , 𝛽𝑖,𝜏
𝑎  to test the robustness of our findings. We will denote with 𝛥𝜎[𝜏1,𝜏2] = 𝜎𝑖,𝜏1 − 𝜎𝑖,𝜏2 
and 𝛥𝛽[𝜏1,𝜏2] = 𝛽𝑖,𝜏1 − 𝛽𝑖,𝜏2 the changes in IV and the TSIV over time windows surrounding the loan 
announcement day.
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 We further use the average of call and put implied volatility (Truong et al., 2012) among our robustness 
checks.  Since both the call and the put implied volatilities from Ivy are close-to-the-money, the average and 
delta-interpolated implied volatilities are almost indistinguishable (average correlation coefficient in excess of 
0.90). Results are unaffected by the use of average, call-only or put-only implied volatility.   
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3. Empirical findings 
3.1 Sample descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for a number of fundamental loan characteristics for the population 
of loan facilities from the Dealscan database with accounting data on Compustat and options data in 
Optionmetrics during 1996-2010. The Table reports, in Panel A, descriptive statistics using Dealscan 
data on the number of lenders (NoLenders), facility maturity (Maturity, in months), facility Spread 
(Spread), facility size  (TrancheSize, in U.S. $ millions), and facility size scaled by Total Assets 
(Loan-to-Asset ratio, using Compustat item #6 for the denominator).
13
 Panel B of the Table reports 
information on the fraction of facilities which are secured (Secured), and also facility type (Type), 
purpose (Purpose), and senior debt credit rating for issuing firms (Credit Rating – for unrated firms 
and in the case of firms with an existing rating, from highest (1) to lowest (6)). All data are reported at 
the facility level, following Qian and Strahan (2007), Kim et al. (2011), and Ferreira and Matos 
(2012), for all sample facilities (announced by the borrowing firm, or by any party separately, as 
described in Section 3.1).   
Insert Table 1 about here. 
We observe from Panel A of Table 1 that loan facilities which have been announced, either by the 
firm itself or in general by any party, are comparable to our overall sample of all (announced and 
unannounced) facilities (from the matched Compustat/Optionmetrics/Dealscan databases) in terms of 
syndicate size, with an average number of ten lenders, and roughly the same could be said for loan 
size in terms of amount, when taking into account mean and median values. However, facility size as 
a percentage of total assets appears to be on average larger for facilities announced by the firm (0.153) 
or announced in general (0.145) compared to all loan facilities (0.122), with the same trend to be 
observed for median values as well. This is consistent with the hypothesis made by Maskara and 
Mullineaux (2011a) that loans representing a large component of the capital structure are more likely 
to be announced. At the same time, we observe for firm-announced facilities, and for all announced 
facilities to a weaker extent, that the average facility spread and maturity (in months) are on average 
larger than the ones observed for the overall population (206.6 b.p. and 195.4 b.p. vs. 162.9 b.p. for 
announced loans–by the firm and in general–vs. the overall population, respectively, and 51.1 and 
50.7 months vs 45.8 months for respective loan maturities, with median values qualitatively similar). 
In this way, announced loans appear to be riskier in terms of spread magnitude than the population of 
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 In accordance with past research, we employ Dealscan’s 'All-in Spread Drawn' item as our facility spread 
proxy, which is equivalent to the amount paid by the borrower in basis points (b.p.) over LIBOR or LIBOR 
equivalent for each dollar drawn (Graham et al., 2008). Please also refer to Appendix A for detailed variable 
definitions. 
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announced and unannounced loans, but at the same time granting institutions are observed to feel safe 
enough to grant them by providing longer time periods for repayment. 
Table 1 Panel B further reports that a greater fraction of announced loans are not secured, in 
comparison to the entire population: about 58% and 53% for loans announced by the firm or in 
general, vs. 38% for the entire population. A casual comparison of respective loan types does not 
reveal big differences, with the majority of loans to be credit lines – around 65%. The same holds for 
loan purpose, with the small exception of a larger percentage of loans to be granted for working 
capital purposes for announced loans by firms (about 25%, and 21% for loans announced by any 
party, vs. 16.5% for all loans). Finally, Panel B of Table 1 reveals that greater percentages of facilities 
for announced loans have senior debt credit ratings of speculative grade (5 and 6) rather than 
investment grade (1 to 4): around 45% vs. 32%, with relevant percentages for unrated loans to be, 
however, quite similar (between 34-37%) for all loans, regardless of whether they have been 
announced or not. Overall, we deduce from descriptive statistics observed from Table 1 that 
announced loans are on average riskier in terms of credit rating and also spread, with a corresponding 
larger percentage of them to be secured, while they also appear to represent a larger proportion of 
borrowing firms’ assets.  
Table 2 further reports summary statistics for a number of firm-specific variables regarding the 
population of loan facilities (as defined in Section 3.1 from the Dealscan database) granted to firms 
with accounting data on Compustat and options data in Optionmetrics between 1996 and 2010. The 
Table reports statistics using Compustat data on firm size (natural logarithm of Total Assets-𝐿𝑛(𝛵𝛢)), 
asset tangibility (𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝑇𝐴), leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣), profitability (𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸/𝑇𝐴), the book-to-market ratio 
(𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑀), and cash flow volatility (𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝐶𝐹𝑂/𝑇𝐴) − calculated using data from the last five years). 
The Table also reports descriptive statistics on (the levels and changes of) our IV proxy, 𝜎𝑖,𝜏, and our 
TSIV proxy 𝛽𝑖,𝜏 around the loan announcement day. Finally, the Table also reports statistics on an 
information asymmetry index (IA) calculated according to Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) and also 
Leary and Roberts (2010), Gomes and Phillips (2010) and Chung and Zhang (2009). This index 
makes use of information on Analyst dispersion, Analyst forecast error, Bid-Ask spreads, and Stock 
return residual volatility, and relevant data (retrieved from the IBES database, and CRSP for stock 
returns) are reported in a continuous form and also in rank form (in this last case on a variable basis as 
well as using an aggregate measure, IA).  The calculation of this composite information asymmetry 
index (IA) index is based on four different information asymmetry proxies, employed by Maskara and 
Mullineaux (2011a) and Gomes and Phillips (2010), and it is calculated as the average quintile 
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ranking of the borrowing firm based on these four information asymmetry measures.
14
 Again, all 
descriptive statistics are reported at the facility level, and detailed variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
We observe from Table 2, Panels A to C,  that firms with announced loans are on average comparable 
to the entire loan facility population in terms of size, and also asset tangibility (around 60%), leverage 
(between 33-36%) and cash flow volatility. Firms with announced loans appear to be slightly less 
profitable on average compared to the population (mean NIBE/TA of 0.008 and 0.013 for loans 
announced by the firm or by any party, compared to 0.022 for the population), and have book-to-
market ratios which are slightly higher (about 0.5 compared to the population average of about 0.48). 
More importantly, we observe that the average value for the information asymmetry proxy (IA), 
expressed in the average of the rank values of four individual proxies is 3.100 and 2.997 for loans 
announced by the firm or in general, compared to the lower value of 2.827 for the entire population of 
announced and unannounced loans. Median values follow the same trend for IA, and the final result 
for respective values is stemming from ranking, on average, higher, in terms of components of the IA 
measure (both in continuous variable as well as in resulting rank value), that is analyst forecast 
dispersion and forecast error, bid-ask spread, and stock return residual volatility, in the case of 
announced loan facilities compared to the population of all facilities. This is indicative of a greater 
probability for a loan facility to be announced, especially by the firm itself, in case the borrowing firm 
faces greater information asymmetry issues, confirming at this point a relevant hypothesis by Maskara 
and Mullineaux (2011a) but this time using population data.  
Finally, from the descriptive statistics on 𝜎𝑖,𝜏, 𝛥𝜎[𝜏1,𝜏2], 𝛽𝑖,𝜏 and 𝛥𝛽[𝜏1,𝜏2], we observe that average IV 
levels and TSIV slope are positive on the event day, with relevant median values to be negative, 
possibly indicating the beginning of the resolution of short-term IV as the loan announcement event 
has occurred. At the same time changes in short-term IV appear to be overall negative around the 
event using median values, with positive median changes in the slope of the TSIV around, and 
especially after the event, providing an initial (and not statistically significant) indication on a 
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 The information asymmetry proxies we employ and the exact calculation of our IA composite index follows 
the work of Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a), Gomes and Phillips (2010), Leary and Roberts (2010), and Chung 
and Zhang (2009), as well as the work of the researchers they cite (Dierkens, 1991; Krishnaswami et al., 1999; 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Bharath et al., 2009). Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) actually use a 
total of six information asymmetry proxies in constructing their composite index; however, we focus on the four 
proxies mentioned in the text (and explained in Appendix A) which represent the common ground in the 
aforementioned studies.  
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tendency of short-term IV to decrease and term structure slope to increase around or following loan 
announcements.  
3.2 Event study analysis: IV and TSIV levels and changes around bank loan announcements 
We first perform a standard event study analysis in order to assess the reaction of the options market 
to loan announcements, by examining the statistical significance of short-term IV and TSIV levels and 
changes around loan announcement events. Table 3 reports means and medians of at-the-money, 
short-term implied volatility levels 𝜎𝑖,𝜏, and changes 𝛥𝜎[𝜏1,𝜏2], as well as levels 𝛽𝑖,𝜏 and changes 
𝛥𝛽[𝜏1,𝜏2] of at-the-money implied volatility term structure, on or around day 𝜏 relative to the sample 
firms’ loan announcement date (day 0). In Panel A, we report mean and median values for volatility 
metrics for loans announced by firms themselves, and in Panel B, we repeat our analysis for loan 
announcements made by any party. The calculation of short-term IV and the term structure of IV is as 
described in Section 3.2.  
Insert Table 3 about here. 
We observe from Table 3 Panels A and B that average (and median) short-term IV is significantly 
positive on the day of bank loan announcement, while the slope of the TSIV curve is significantly 
negative (using median, but not mean values); both observations are consistent with an increase in 
short-term IV on the event day, pushing this way the slope of the TSIV downwards. This result is 
considered to be consistent with increased uncertainty experienced by market participants regarding 
the content of the announcement and its possible impact on the firm prospects, which is expressed by 
higher levels of short-term IV.  Regarding changes in short-term IV, we observe significant increases 
in short-term IV between ten days before the announcement up to the event day (only for loans 
announced by the firm – using mean and median values), and significant decreases or resolution in 
such volatility around (windows of [-10,+10] and [-1,+1]) or after (windows of  [0,+10] and [0,+1]) 
the announcement (using median values) for all loans (regardless of who announced the loan); the 
time window [-1,0] with reference to the announcement is observed to exhibit the same behavior as is 
the case with pre-post or after the event time windows. These results are stronger in the case of 
medians, compared to means, and in the case of the [-1,0] event window, they are considered to be an 
indication of incorporation of all relevant loan event information within IV dynamics right before the 
event has occurred, resulting from significant market efficiency.  
In the case of changes in the TSIV slope, we observe (with the exception of the of [-10,0] event 
window) a significant tendency for the slope to increase around or after the event, especially when 
using median rather than mean values for TSIV changes. Most interestingly, the significant tendency 
for an increase in the slope of the TSIV is also in the case of the [-10,+10] window using median 
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values, an indication that the loan announcement event has overall resulted in increases in the TSIV 
slope, regardless of any market microstructure influence the event could have had on the behavior of 
the TSIV on the days immediately preceding or succeeding the event, consistent with investors 
becoming more unsure on the long-term economic prospects and downside risk potential of borrowing 
firms as a result of the loan agreement.  
Overall, the option market appears to react more intensely and results are observed to be stronger for 
loans announced by the firm itself rather than announced in general (despite the larger number of 
observations for the latter group), consistent with Maskara and Mullineaux’s (2011a) expectation for 
stronger information asymmetries for loans announced by firms themselves. Moreover, we observe 
very weak results for the [-10,0], an indication that market participants may not be very well informed 
and anticipating the incidence and informational content of the imminent loan announcement. Taken 
as a whole, results are considered to be consistent with a material influence of loan announcement 
events on the behavior of IV on the day or around the announcement event, resulting in increased 
uncertainty experienced by market participants which is expressed by higher levels of short-term IV 
on the day of the event, and a significant resolution in short-term volatility once the event has 
occurred. However, overall the loan announcements by the firms are observed to significantly modify 
the short vs. long term risk estimation profile for borrowing firms, resulting in significant increases in 
the TSIV slope around or after the loan announcement.  
In order to complement our event study results so far, we repeat the analysis, by splitting the 
population to sub-samples that are constructed based on several different loan characteristics. In Panel 
A of Table 4, we separate loan facilities depending on (a) whether they have been announced by the 
firm itself or by any party other than the firm, (b) according to credit rating (investment grade vs. 
speculative grade or unrated senior debt), (c) maturity (shorter or longer than two years), and (d) 
spread size (lower/higher than 150 basis points (bp)). In Panel B, we separate loan facilities according 
to firm information asymmetry proxies, using the methodology proposed by Maskara and Mullineaux 
(2011a) for information asymmetry measurement, from lowest (1) to highest (5).   
Insert Table 4 about here. 
There can be observed from Table 4 Panel A that there do not exist on average significant and 
consistent differences in the behavior of short-term IV and the TSIV depending on whether a loan has 
been announced by the firm itself or announced by any party other than the firm. A notable exception 
to this is the level of short-term IV on the day of the loan announcement event, which is significantly 
higher for loans announced by the firm itself. Short-term IV on the day of the announcement event 
also appears to be significantly higher for loans without a senior debt credit rating, or credit ratings at 
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the speculative rather than investment grade, while speculative grade and even more unrated loans are 
observed to experience significantly larger increases in the slope of their TSIV curve around or after 
loan announcements. The option market reaction to loan announcements is also overall found to be 
more pronounced for loans with higher maturity (higher vs. lower than two years) and higher spreads 
(higher vs. lower than 150 b.p.), especially when it comes to the level of short-term IV on the loan 
announcement day, although this result is not observed to be the case for all time windows examined.  
We further observe from Table 4 Panel B an almost monotonic and statistically significant increase in 
the level of short-term IV as information asymmetry levels for borrowing firms also increase. At the 
same time, we observe that changes in short-term IV tend to become significantly more pronounced 
as information asymmetry increases, and the same applies for changes in the slope of the TSIV, 
although not for all time windows examined. In this context, our findings from Table 3 appear to be 
more pronounced for firms with higher vs. lower levels of information asymmetry, and also lower 
credit ratings or no credit ratings at all, and loans with longer maturities and higher spreads. We 
consider these results to be consistent with a stronger reaction from the side of option market 
participants to bank loans with a possibly higher degree of uncertainty and difficulty to make accurate 
predictions on the future firm economic performance, and resulting possibility for downside or default 
risk of borrowing firms.
15
  
3.3 Determinants of option market reaction around bank loan announcements 
Research on the stock market reaction to bank loan announcements has been quite limited with 
respect to which factors make this reaction stronger vs. weaker. With the exception of Slovin et al. 
(1992) for firm size, Best and Zhang (1993) for creditor creditworthiness, Billett et al. (1995) and 
Handlock and James (2002) for credit ratings and spreads, respectively, or Fields et al. (2006) for 
firms with poorer marker performance up to the announcement, past studies do not consistently 
identify significant firm-specific factors making stock market reaction stronger vs. weaker in the 
context of regression analysis. For example, Byers et al. (2008)–using the sample of Fields et al. 
(2006)–find that the only firm-specific factor (unrelated to corporate governance) which significantly 
relates to stock returns is the existence of debt in the borrower’s capital structure.  
Moreover, none of the past studies we are aware of take into consideration the “self-selection bias 
[that] affects extant loan announcement research” as Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a, p. 684) point 
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 Table 4 reports information on a more limited number of time windows compared to Table 3 for brevity. 
Results in Table 4 are qualitatively similar (actually stronger) when using median rather than mean values. 
Moreover, tests in Table 4 have been re-calculated (where applicable) for all loans that have been announced by 
any party (by the firm or any other party), but remain qualitatively similar if repeated for loans announced by 
the firm only.  
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out: firms ‘self-select’ to announce the securing of a new loan facility, potentially introducing 
endogeneity into the findings of any simple regression analysis that attempts to identify factors related 
to market reaction to the announcement. 
Therefore, in this section of our analysis, we examine which firm or loan-specific factors possibly 
affect the option market reaction to bank loan announcements through the use of a two-step Heckman 
(1979) selection model for both short-term IV and the TSIV. We employ the Heckman (1979) two-
step procedure, in an effort to account for endogeneity, sample selection issues and possible 
influences in the way firm or loan-specific factors relate to the option-market reaction to bank loan 
announcements stemming from the very fact that such loans have been announced. The first step in 
the Heckman (1979) procedure estimates a probit model over the entire sample of announced and 
unannounced loan facilities, in order to test for possible factors with an influence on the possibility for 
a bank loan to be announced by the firm or not. The model estimated in the first step is 
𝑃𝑟[𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 1]) = 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡𝜸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
= 𝛷(𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾6,𝑚𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑚
𝑒𝑖,𝑡)  (3) 
The variable 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan facility 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
was announced by the firm itself, and zero if the firm did not make such an announcement. Operators 
𝑃𝑟[. ] and 𝛷(. ) denote probability and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution respectively. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix A. The choice of 
independent variables included in the first stage of the Heckman procedure follows directly from the 
hypotheses and evidence in Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a); they are expected to capture factors that 
make a loan more or less probable to be announced by the borrowing firm.
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In the second stage of the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure, we estimate the following 
specification, in an effort to directly assess which firm or loan-specific factors with a possible 
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 In the first-stage equation, we make use of a bottom-line negative earnings dummy variable while Maskara 
and Mullineaux (2011a)  use a relevant variable for negative EBITDA, to account for the effect of bottom-line 
earnings on the probability that a loan is secured or not. Findings remain qualitatively similar when a size 
regressor (natural logarithm of market value of equity) is added in the probit model regression, in line with one 
alternative model specification used by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a), and the same applies when estimating 
an ordered probit model, in which the dependent variable takes different values depending on whether the bank 
loan was announced by the firm itself, by parties other than the firm, or not announced at all (untabulated data). 
Results from the probit model estimation (and also overall results from Tables 5 and 6) remain qualitatively 
similar in case the dependent variable takes the value of one if the loan is announced by any party (rather than 
the firm itself) and zero otherwise (untabulated results). We chose, however, to report results when the 
dependent variable is equal to one when the loan is announced by the firm, in line with Maskara and Mullineaux 
(2011a), as such loans are expected to be more strongly related to information asymmetries. Finally, results from 
Tables 5 and 6 are robust to the inclusion of industry dummy variables (according to 2-digit SIC codes 
(untabulated results) in addition to year indicator variables for both stages of the Heckman (1979) estimation 
procedure. 
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influence on the option market reaction to bank loan announcements are significant, after controlling 
in the first stage for sample selection bias (option market reaction is only observed for announced 
loans): 
{𝜎𝑖,𝜏, 𝛽𝑖,𝜏, 𝛥𝜎[𝜏1,𝜏2], 𝛥𝛽[𝜏1,𝜏2]} = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼2,𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
 
+ ∑ 𝛼3,𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑙,𝑖
𝑙
+ 𝛼4𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼5,𝑚𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑚
𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (4) 
We employ all of our IV and TSIV proxies, levels and changes around the announcement day, as 
dependent variables in separate estimations of the Heckman (1979) second stage. We include the VIX 
index (in level or change form, depending on the time window of the dependent variable each time) as 
a market control to account for the effect of overall market uncertainty on firm equity option market 
reaction to bank loan announcements. Firm-specific control variables include firm size, tangibility, 
leverage, profitability, growth (using the book-to-market ratio as a relevant proxy) and cash flow 
variability.
17
 Loan specific independent variables include an indicator variable for loan securitization, 
loan (tranche) size, maturity, number of lenders, loan spread, and credit rating. We further employ 
controls for loan type and purpose, following past research examining determining factors of bank 
loan pricing (see for example Graham et al., 2008, and Kim et al., 2011). The selection of the control 
and independent variables that are included in the right-hand side (all of them defined in Appendix A) 
is largely based on past research regarding the effect of firm or loan-specific factors on the behavior 
of stock markets to bank loan announcements (e.g. Byers et al., 2008, Billet et al., 1995, 2006 and 
Slovin et al., 1992, for firm size; Best and Zhang (1993) for creditor creditworthiness and Hadlock 
and James (2002) for credit spreads). Finally, the second-stage equation features the so-called inverse 
Mill’s ratio (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖) that is produced by the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure and accounts 
for the potential omitted variable problem caused by the non-random nature of our loan 
announcements. 
Estimation of the two equations of the Heckman (1979) procedure is performed via Full-information 
Maximum Likelihood and results are summarized in Tables 5 and 6. In both tables, the coefficients’ 
statistical significance is assessed by making use of robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. 
In both tables, Panel A reports estimation results for the first step of the Heckman (1979) estimation 
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 Fields et al. (2006) find that bank loan renewal announcement returns are more likely to be positive for firms 
with poorer stock price performance up to the announcements, while Hadlock and James (2002) relate the level 
and volatility of prior year returns to the probability of a bank agreement over a public debt issue taking place. 
In this respect, we have repeated the analysis by including regressors for the level and volatility of market 
performance (well and above the volatility of operating cash flows) and (untabulated) results remain 
qualitatively similar. 
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procedure, while Panel B for the second stage. Predicted signs reported in Panels A of Tables 5 and 6 
are as hypothesized and observed by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) in their study. For brevity, only 
results on 10-day windows for changes in short-term IV and TSIV are reported in Panels B of Tables 
5 and 6. 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here. 
We observe from Panel A of both Tables 5 and 6 that the signs and statistical significance of factors 
making a loan announcement by the borrowing firm more vs. less probable generally conform to the 
ones observed by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) using a random sampling technique for loan 
identification, but this time for the universe of firms with data on Compustat, Optionmetrics and 
Dealscan (with the exception of the lack of significance for the loss indicator in Panel A of Table 6). 
Findings from Panels A indicate that it is significantly more probable for a loan to be announced if a 
firm faces larger information asymmetry, or is experiencing a loss in the fiscal year, or the loan 
represents a higher proportion of the borrowing firm’s assets. 
The results in Panel B, Tables 5 and 6, indicate a significant association between market-wide 
volatility levels and changes, for which relevant returns of the VIX index are used as a proxy, and the 
firm-specific levels and changes in short-term IV and the TSIV around bank loan events, although 
relevant results are stronger for short-term IV compared to the TSIV. Moreover, the inverse Mill’s 
ratio (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖) that is produced by the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure and accounts for the 
potential omitted variable problem caused by the non-random nature of our loan announcements 
appears statistically significant in virtually all specifications, providing some reassurance for the 
appropriateness of our approach. 
Furthermore, we observe from Panel B of Table 5 a positive association between leverage and short-
term IV changes (but not levels) as of the day of bank loan announcements, with the exception of the 
[-10,0] event window. At the same time, changes (but again not levels) in short-term IV are found to 
be stronger as firm size decreases and operating cash flow volatility increases, with this last result to 
also hold for short-term IV levels as well (at 1% significance level). We also observe a significantly 
negative association between profitability and asset tangibility and the level of short-term IV on the 
event day, indicating that volatility is higher for less profitable firms and firms with fewer tangible 
assets, with no evidence of significance for these variables in the changes in volatility regressions.  
Regarding loan-specific variables, we find that short-term IV levels on the day of the loan 
announcement positively relate to whether a loan is secured and to the magnitude of the credit spread, 
while short-term IV levels significantly and negatively relate (at acceptable levels of significance) to 
the number of lenders of the loan, loan maturity, loan size, and credit rating, indicating higher 
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uncertainty for loans of firms pledging more collateral in order to secure a loan, loans with higher 
spreads, and also loans of smaller borrowing  firms, with larger lending syndicates to possibly 
diversify higher credit risk by borrowers, and loans with higher maturities. However, loan size 
appears to be the only loan-specific variable consistently (positively) relating to changes in short-term 
IV, with very limited evidence for the number of lenders and loan maturity, and no such evidence for 
senior debt credit rating or loan spread, upon including controls for a number of other loan-specific 
variables.   
We additionally observe from Panel B of Table 6 that firm size and asset tangibility significantly 
negatively (positively) associated with changes in slope of the TSIV before loan announcement events 
(between minus 10 and zero days), and further significantly associated with higher resolutions TSIV 
slope after the event has taken place in the case of size. There is further observed a negative (positive) 
link between firm size (asset tangibility) and the slope of the TSIX on the day of the event. However, 
there exists very limited and sporadic evidence regarding the statistical significance of other firm-
specific factors (for example, in the case of cash flow volatility for the [0,+10] event window for 
changes regressions, or firm growth for the [-10,0] event window) for the determination of TSIV 
levels and changes around loan announcement events.
18
   
As is the case in Panel B of Table 5 for short-term IV, we get evidence of a stronger statistical 
significance for loan-specific factors when we examine levels, rather than changes in the slope of the 
TSIV. The level of the TSIV significantly and positively relates to the probability that the loan has 
been secured and to loan size. Regarding changes in the TSIV, we get stronger evidence (for at least 
two time windows examined) only for a significant effect of loan size on TSIV slope changes, with an 
increasing effect on the slope before the event and a decreasing contribution to the slope afterwards. 
At the same time, we observe that loan security and size positively associate with changes in the slope 
of the TSIV on the day of the loan announcement event, while the number of lenders negatively 
(positively) relate to TSIV slope changes before (after) the event, while the exact opposite occurs for 
loan size, with limited evidence on the statistical significance of the other loan-specific factors for the 
TSIV regressions. In this way, TSIV changes appear to be significantly more intense (in absolute 
terms) depending on loan size and syndicate magnitude.  
Our evidence from Tables 5 and 6 overall indicates that a considerable number of firm or loan-
specific factors significantly associate with the level and changes of short-term IV and TSIV, as we 
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 Cash flow volatility is observed to negatively relate to changes in the TSIV for time windows around or after 
the loan announcement event, indicating stronger decreases in the slope of the TSIV curve for firms with lower 
cash flow volatility, or firms posing fewer concerns with respect to the historical variability of their operating 
cash flows.  
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observe that option markets tend to react more strongly to announcements by smaller firms, and by 
firms with lower profitability, higher historical cash flow volatility and leverage ratios, and this 
reaction further depends on loan size and number of lenders. This evidence is consistent with option 
markets reacting more sensitively to the announcement of loans which could result in larger material 
changes for borrowing firms, or loans of firms with fundamental characteristics inherently considered 
to be more risky, for example small size or high cash flow volatility. We consider that this evidence 
provides indications on a considerable degree of efficiency for option markets market efficiency, 
given that past evidence on the sensitivity of stock market reaction to firm or loan-specific 
characteristics using a similar regression setting has been quite weak (Byers et al., 2008). 
Before leaving this section, it should be noted that the Heckman selection model we employ in our 
empirical investigation depends strongly on the model being correct (Guo and Fraser, 2014). Theory 
and evidence from past empirical investigations have little guidance to offer as to which covariates or 
proxies achieve correct identification (i.e. satisfy the exclusion requirement); a notable exception is 
the hypotheses and empirical findings of Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) that have partly motivated 
our research, where it is established that (a) information asymmetry and (b) large loan size (when 
compared to the firm’s asset base) are key proxies in identifying ‘announcing’ against ‘non-
announcing’ bank borrowing firms in their sample. Hence our implementation of the Heckman 
selection model follows their lead by employing 𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 in the first 
stage equation. Whether one, two, all or none of these proxies achieve correct identification is an issue 
that, in the absence of theory, can only be argued and examined empirically. Given the importance of 
this choice for our empirical framework in this section, we have conducted repeated estimations of 
(3)-(4), where now only one independent variable from (3) (i.e. only 𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 in one specification, 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 in a second, etc.) does not appear in (is excluded from) the second-stage equation 
(4). Results from these alternative specifications of the Heckman model, which are unreported in the 
sake of brevity but are made available from the authors upon request, are qualitatively similar, in that 
firm size, profitability, historical cash flow volatility and leverage continue to appear as the most 
important firm-specific determinants of implied volatility dynamics around firm loan announcements, 
and this further depends on the size of the loan announced and the number of lenders involved. 
Furthermore, experiments (unreported) that employ in equation (3) alternative identifying covariates, 
other than those in Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) (such as the interest coverage ratio that captures 
whether the borrower faces higher prospects of cash flow problems, making it more probable to 
announce a new loan) leave the estimates of equation (4) and conclusions reached  largely unaffected. 
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4. The economic significance of the option market reaction around firm loan 
announcements 
The findings of our event study in Section 2 establish the statistical significance of IV and TSIV 
changes around loan announcements that are initiated by borrowing firms. We find statistically 
significant decreases of short-term equity implied volatility, and significant increases in the slope of 
the implied volatility term structure around the loan announcement day, and by their magnitude the 
reported increases/decreases seem to be material in an economic sense. 
In order to provide further evidence on the economic significance of the event study findings, we 
conduct in this Section an (in-sample) trading strategy that is based on the findings of the IV and 
TSIV changes around the announcement day. Given that firm loan announcements are largely 
unanticipated events, we concentrate only on trading strategies that can be implemented after the 
actual announcement by the firm, thus not dealing with the possibility that the imminent 
announcement has entered the information set of investors or (firm and bank) insiders. 
More specifically, given that short-term, at-the-money implied volatility from equity options is found 
to decrease significantly, on average, in the ten days following the announcement day (see Table 2), 
while the term structure of at-the-money implied volatility increases over the same time window, one 
way to exploit the findings of this study for trading purposes would be to ‘go long’ (buy) equity 
options of longer maturities following the loan announcement, while at the same time ‘going short’ 
(selling) the short-term option contracts.  
The trading strategy, termed strategy A, is implemented as follows: whenever a new loan facility is 
announced by our sample firms, we invest $500 by going long at-the-money straddles on its stock 
with a longest available expiry. This investment is financed by selling (shorting), the same day, the 
necessary number of at-the-money straddles with a short-term expiry (30 days). The position is 
maintained for 10 trading days and then closed by taking reverse positions.
19
 Concentrating on 
straddles allows one to focus trading solely on the effect of changes in (implied) volatility of the 
underlying asset, and the strategy is self-financed in that no own investment of funds is required. The 
strategy is repeated for all loan facility announcements made by sample firms. 
To avoid market microstructure issues and to account for the possibility that an announcement can be 
made after trading hours, we conduct an alternative trading strategy, termed strategy B, where the 
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 A straddle is a combination of a call option and a put option on the same underlying asset, with the same 
maturity and strike price. If an announcement is made during the weekend or a holiday (52 announcements), the 
strategy is executed from the next trading day onwards.       
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same trades are executed but over the [+1, +10] day window relative to the announcement day. This is 
exactly as strategy A, under the restriction that the announcement day is ‘missed’.20 
Before turning to the results of the two strategies, three important notes are in order: First of all, 
although up to now we have been reporting results using the ‘delta-interpolated’ implied volatility 
levels and slopes for convenience, the actual (not averaged, not interpolated) call and put option prices 
and implied volatilities are used in calculating the position costs and profits for the trading strategies. 
Secondly, to keep the reported numbers as simple as possible, the option contract ‘multipliers’ (100 
shares of the underlying stock) are ignored in calculating both the costs and profits of the strategy (as 
their effect is neutral). Finally, it should be noted that margin requirements and margin calls for 
uncovered short positions have been ignored in the calculations.
21
  
The profits/losses of the trading strategies A and B are reported on Table 7, Panels A and B 
respectively, under the assumption of no transaction costs. Both strategies yield significant profits in 
total and on average as the last column of the Table indicates. Strategy A yields a sum of $21,072.43 
in profit, with 53.12% of the 2,541 total trades executed being profitable. The mean profit is $8.32 
(i.e. 1.66% return on the self-financed average position size of $500) and the median profit is $5.50 
(i.e. 1.10% return on the $500 position size). Both the mean ($8.32) and median ($5.50) profits are 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The profits are driven by the ‘long leg’ of the 
strategy (buying straddles on long-term expiries when the announcement is made to exploit the 
increase in the term structure), as the profits of the strategy ‘short leg’ (selling straddles on short-term 
expiries) appear fairly negatively skewed (yielding significant profits only in median terms). 
Abstaining from trading on the loan announcement day (Strategy B) seems to introduce more 
skeweness to the profits of both strategy ‘legs’, making the overall profits higher, but only significant 
in means (average profit of $12.89; 2.58% in relative terms). 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
To assess the performance of the strategy in the presence of transaction costs, we repeat the trading 
exercise by imposing the following fee structure (ignoring the ‘multiplier’ again): $0.12 total fee for 
up to 5 contracts traded, $0.20 total fee for up to 10 contracts traded, $0.50 total fee for up to 50 
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 Again, for strategy B, for all announcements made during the weekend or a holiday, the strategy is executed 
from the next trading day onwards. 
21
 If one were to include the ‘multiplier’, the long positions initiated would cost 100 times more, but also 100 
times more would be the proceeds from the short positions. Moreover, note that by ignoring margin calls for 
uncovered short positions, our results ignore occasions where the investor would have to finance the 
maintenance of the margin account level over the 10-day horizon out of her own pocket. 
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contracts traded and $0.75 total fee for trading 100 contracts and above.
22
 Results appear in Table 8 
and are essentially largely unaffected by trading expenses. Profits are diminished by transaction costs 
but the strategies continue to yield statistically significant mean profits of $6.83 (1.37% for strategy 
A) and $11.40 (2.28% for strategy B), attributed mainly to the long positions initiated. 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
The findings of our trading strategies in this Section cannot be considered as evidence of inefficiency 
in the options market as several issues not explicitly addressed (market microstructure, margin call 
requirements) could diminish the magnitude of the profits reported. For example, the strategies’ 
average profits are well-within the bid-ask spreads that an investor in the option market would face, 
and these are not accounted for in this Section.
23
 However, the objective of this trading exercise is 
mainly to establish the economic (in addition to the statistical) significance of the option market 
reaction, as manifested by implied volatility, to loan announcements and the results of Tables 7 and 8 
seem to accomplish that. 
      
5. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the literature by being the first that examines the option market reaction to 
bank loan announcements made by NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed firms during 1996-2010. 
Past research has examined the stock market reaction to firm loan announcements, by using random 
sampling techniques in order to construct a representative sample of loans from the population, 
reaching contrasting conclusions, possibly due to the ‘self-selectivity’ of loan announcements by 
listed firms. 
The reaction of the options market, although it has been shown to lead the stock market in several 
respects, has been neglected by previous research, and our study fills this gap by establishing that 
there are statistically significant decreases of short-term implied volatility, and significant increases in 
the slope of the implied volatility term structure around the loan announcement days. Importantly, our 
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 By total fee, the sum of any base fee plus the per-contract fee is meant. The fee structure imposed is 
essentially the average from ten different brokers through which an individual investor could trade. 
23
 Phillips and Smith (1980) identify the bid-offer spread as the largest cost facing option investors. Although 
options exchanges only set upper limits for the bid-ask spreads, which may range from $0.25 to $1.00 per 
transaction (see Hull, 2003), the actual quoted or effective bid-offer spreads at which investors trade equity 
options are below that, but still substantial. For example, in his study on the liquidity of the CBOE equity 
options, Vijh (1990) reports an average bid-ask spread of 21.3 cents, with less than 1.5% of the bid-ask spreads 
in his sample ever exceeding 50 cents. The study by Amin and Lee (1997), that reports an average effective bid-
ask spread of 16.6 cents on equity option trades surrounding earnings announcement, offers an example of an 
equity option trading strategy with statistically significant profits, which turn to losses once the bid-ask spreads 
are accounted for (see Amin and Lee, 1997, Table 5 and the discussion that follows it). 
26 
 
study bases its entire analysis not on a representative sample of loans, but on all loans and 
announcements (manually-collected from Lexis/Nexis) made by all firms with data on Compustat and 
Optionmetrics and bank loan facility data on Dealscan, a data collection process that yields the 
population of firms with equity options traded that made a loan announcement between 1996 and 
2010. 
Our empirical investigation, that explicitly accounts for the selectivity of firm-initiated loan 
announcements, shows that the main findings (i.e. significant decreases in short-term implied 
volatility and significant increases in the slope of the implied volatility term structure around the loan 
announcement days) appear more pronounced for loans by firms which could be considered to be 
facing more information asymmetries or possess fundamental characteristics traditionally linked to 
greater risk e.g. smaller size, or cash flow volatility. Our findings are consistent with the view that 
loan announcements provide significant reassurance for investors in the short-term (due to the 
monitoring role that loan issuing banks can play); however, over longer time horizons, the increase in 
the slope of implied volatility term structure would indicate that investors become increasingly unsure 
over borrowing firm prospects in the long-run, for example, regarding the likelihood of loan 
repayment or the use of the proceeds.  
We consider that our study also indirectly contributes to on-going discussion on the nature of firm 
loan announcements by establishing that, for the options market, such announcements are indeed 
economically significant and exploitable, through a profitable trading strategy that is based on our 
main findings. 
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Appendix A  
This Appendix contains variable definitions for firm and loan-specific variables (Compustat items in 
parentheses). 
Financial Variable Description Compustat/Dealscan item 
calculation 
Firm-specific variables 
Information asymmetry index 
- IA 
Composite index based on four information 
asymmetry benchmarks: analyst forecast errors, 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, residual 
volatility of stock returns, and bid-ask spreads, 
based on Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) and 
Gomes and Phillips (2010). Following Maskara 
and Mullineaux (2011a) and Gomes and Phillips 
(2010), the information asymmetry index is the 
average quintile ranking of the borrowing firm 
based on the four information asymmetry 
measures. These measures are calculated for the 
sample firms for each year, and firms are 
grouped into quintiles for all the firms in the 
year a loan is announced, in order to avoid the 
effect of secular trends in the measures over 
time, following Maskara and Mullineaux 
(2011a). Forecast error is equal to the absolute 
difference between analysts’ forecasted earnings 
and actual earnings per share in the month prior 
to the annual earnings announcement. 
Dispersion of analyst opinions is equal to the 
standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of 
annual EPS in the last month prior to the 
earnings announcement. Both the forecast error 
and volatility variables are standardized by share 
price.  Residual volatility in daily stock returns 
is the standard deviation of market-adjusted 
daily stock returns in the year of the loan 
announcement (bid- ask spreads measured as the 
average ratio of the difference between the daily 
bid and ask closing prices to the midpoint of the 
bid and ask closing prices, following Maskara 
and Mullineaux (2011a) and Chung and Zhang 
(2009), by imposing the requirement for at least 
100 observations per year to calculate spread an 
residual volatility). Information on analyst 
forecasts has been retrieved by IBES, while 
information on stock returns from CRSP.  
 
LOSS Loss indicator, equal to 1 if Net Income before 
Extraordinary Items and Preferred Dividends is 
negative, and 0 otherwise 
1 if (#18) <0, and 0 
otherwise 
Loan-to-Asset ratio 
(TRANCHE/TA) 
Loan tranche size scaled by Total Assets as of 
the year of the facility active date 
Dealscan item ‘Tranche 
Amount (Converted) ($)’/(#6) 
Ln MVE Natural logarithm of annual market value of 
equity as of the year of the facility active date.  
Market value is calculated by multiplying the 
closing price at fiscal year-end by the number 
Log (#199*#25) 
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shares outstanding  
. LnTA Natural logarithm of annual Total Assets in 
million dollars as of the year of the facility 
active date 
Log(#44) 
GPPE/TA Annual Gross value of Property, Plant and 
Equipment, scaled by Total Assets, as of the 
year of the facility active date 
(#7)/(#6) 
Lev Annual leverage ratio, or Total Debt (sum of 
short and long term debt), divided by Total 
Assets, as of the year of the facility active date 
((#34 +#9)/ (#6)) 
NIBE/TA Annual Net Income before Extraordinary Items 
and Preferred Dividends scaled by Total Assets, 
as of the year of the facility active date  
(#18)/(#6) 
BtoM The book-to-market ratio used as a proxy for 
firms’ growth opportunities, as of the year of the 
facility active date.  Market value is calculated 
by multiplying the closing price at fiscal year-
end by the number shares outstanding,  
((#60)/(#199*#25)) 
Vol(CFO/TA) Volatility of CFO, or standard deviation of 
yearly cash flows from operations over the past 
5 years, scaled by annual Total Assets as the 
year of the facility active date  
(StDev of #108)/(#6) 
VIX (or Δln(VIX)) The return of the VIX index for time windows 
identical as the ones used for the definition of 
the return variable, for both levels and changes 
in IV and the TSIV 
- 
Industry Indicators Industry dummy variables according to 2-digit 
industry SIC codes 
- 
Loan-specific variables 
Secured Secured loan indicator, or taking value of 1, if 
Dealscan variable Secured/Unsecured=' 
Secured', and 0 otherwise 
Dealscan item 
‘Secured/Unsecured’ 
LnNoLenders Natural logarithm of the tranche number of 
lenders, as given by Dealscan 
Dealscan item ‘Number of 
Lenders’ 
LnMaturity Facility (tranche) maturity, equal to the natural 
logarithm of loan maturity in months, as given 
by Dealscan 
Dealscan item ‘Tenor/ 
Maturity’ 
LnTrancheSize Facility (tranche) size, equal to the natural 
logarithm of loan tranche size in USD, as given 
by Dealscan 
Dealscan item ‘Tranche 
Amount (Converted) ($)’ 
LnSpread Loan tranche spread over basic rate, equal to the 
natural logarithm of Dealscan item 'All-in 
Spread Drawn' 
Dealscan item ‘All-in spread 
Drawn’ 
Rating Ordinal variable taking values from 1 to 6, 
depending on the credit rating of the firm (in 
descending order). There is made use of the 
Dealscan item for ratings at the end of the loan, 
following Qian and Strahan (2007). There is 
made use of the Moody's or S&P (if Moody's 
rating data is not available, then data is 
complemented by using relevant S&P data, in 
case available) for senior debt ratings (Qian and 
Strahan, 2007). 
The variable takes the value of 1 if senior debt 
rating = Aaa (or the S&P equivalent), 2 for 
Dealscan item ‘Ratings-All 
At Close’ 
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ratings until Aa3, 3 for rating values below Aa3 
but above A3 (inclusive), 4 for a ratings below 
A3 but higher than Baa3 (inclusive), 5 for a 
rating lower than Baa3 but higher than Ba3 
(inclusive) and 6 for a rating below Ba3. The 
variable is set equal to 0 if an abovementioned 
rating does not exist.  
Loan facilities with Rating = 1,2,3,4 are 
considered to be of Investment grade, while 
Rating values of 5 and 6 are considered to be of 
Speculative grade. 
Type Facility (tranche) type categorical variable, 
taking different values depending on the 
Specific Tranche Type reported by Dealscan for 
the tranche in question 
Dealscan item ‘Specific 
Tranche Type’ 
Type: Term loan Referring to facilities (tranches) representing 
term loans  
Dealscan item ‘Specific 
Trance Type’ = Term loan, or 
Term Loan A, B, C….K, or 
Delay Draw Term Loan, or 
Revolver/Term Loan 
Type: Credit line Referring to facilities (tranches) representing 
credit lines  
Dealscan item ‘Specific 
Trance Type’ = 364-Day 
Facility, or Demand Loan, or 
Limited Line, or 
Revolver/Line < 1 Yr. or 
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. The 
definition of credit lines is 
based on Lim et al. (2014) 
Type: Acquisition facility Referring to facilities (tranches) representing 
acquisition facilities 
Dealscan item ‘Specific 
Tranche Type’= Acquisition 
Facility 
Type: Bridge loan Referring to facilities (tranches) representing 
bridge loans 
Dealscan item ‘Specific 
Tranche Type’= Bridge Loan 
Type: CAPEX facility Referring to facilities (tranches) representing 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) facilities 
Dealscan item ‘Specific 
Tranche Type’= CAPEX 
Facility 
Purpose Facility (tranche) purpose categorical variable, 
taking different values depending on the Primary 
Purpose reported by Dealscan for the tranche in 
question  
Dealscan item ‘Primary 
Purpose’ 
Purpose: Acquisition line Facility (tranche) primary purpose is to 
constitute an acquisition line 
Dealscan item ‘Primary 
Purpose’ = Acquis. line 
Purpose: Capital expenditure Facility (tranche) primary purpose is to fund 
capital expenditures 
Dealscan item ‘Primary 
Purpose’ = Capital expend. 
Purpose: Corporate 
purposes 
Facility (tranche) primary purpose is to fund 
corporate purposes  
Dealscan item ‘Primary 
Purpose’ = Corp. purposes 
Purpose: Credit 
enhancement  
Facility (tranche) primary purpose is to provide 
credit enhancement 
Dealscan item ‘Primary 
Purpose’ = Cred Enhanc. 
Purpose: Debt repayment  Facility (tranche) primary purpose is to fund 
debt repayment 
Dealscan item ‘Primary 
Purpose’ = Debt Repay. 
Purpose: Takeover Facility (tranche) primary purpose is to fund a 
takeover 
Dealscan item ‘Primary 
Purpose’ = Takeover 
Purpose: Working capital  Facility (tranche) primary purpose is to fund 
working capital requirements 
Dealscan item ‘Primary 
Purpose’ = Work. cap. 
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics – Loan-specific variables. The table reports summary 
statistics for a number of fundamental loan characteristics for the population of loan facilities (as 
defined in Section 3.1; loan facilities from the Dealscan database, with accounting data on Compustat 
and options data in Optionmetrics during 1996-2010). The Table reports in Panel A statistics using 
Dealscan data on the number or lenders (NoLenders), facility maturity (Maturity, in months), facility 
spread (Spread), facility size  (TrancheSize, in U.S. $ millions), and facility size scaled by Total 
Assets (Loan-to-Asset ratio, using Compustat item #6 for the denominator). Panel B of the Table 
reports information on the fraction of facilities which are secured (Secured), and also facility type 
(Type), purpose (Purpose), and senior debt credit rating for issuing firms (Credit Rating – for unrated 
firms and in the case of firms with an existing rating, from highest (1) to lowest (6)). All data are 
reported at the facility level, following Qian and Strahan (2007), Kim et al. (2011), and Ferreira and 
Matos (2012), for all sample facilities, as well as facilities announced by the firm, or by any party 
separately (following the sample definition described in Section 3.1).  Detailed variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Loan-specific data – fundamental characteristics  
Variables Q1 Mean Median Q3 St. Dev. No. 
Obs. 
       
Loan facilities announced by 
firm       
NoLenders 4.0 9.8 8.0 13.0 9.3 2,891 
Maturity (in months) 36.0 51.1 60.0 60.0 23.6 2,833 
Spread 100.0 206.6 175.0 275.0 142.6 2,642 
   TrancheSize (in U.S. $ mil.) 100 426 200 500 829 2,896 
Loan-to-Asset ratio 0.064 0.153 0.122 0.211 0.122 2,826 
All announced loan facilities       
NoLenders 4.0 10.5 8.0 14.0 9.9 5,413 
Maturity (in months) 36.0 50.7 60.0 60.0 25.3 5,284 
Spread 87.5 195.4 175.0 275.0 139.1 4,955 
   TrancheSize (in U.S. $ mil.) 100 500 250 500 1,030 5,422 
Loan-to-Asset ratio 0.061 0.145 0.114 0.198 0.116 5,227 
All loan facilities       
NoLenders 3.0 9.4 7.0 13.0 9.6 12,887 
Maturity (in months) 20.0 45.8 48.0 60.0 28.1 12,135 
Spread 60.0 162.9 125.0 238.0 134.6 11,213 
   TrancheSize (in U.S. $ mil.) 100 489 225 500 943 12,928 
Loan-to-Asset ratio 0.044 0.122 0.090 0.168 0.113 12,478 
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Panel B: Loan-specific data – security, type, purpose and credit rating 
  Loans announced by firm  All announced loans  All loans 
Loan Secured  No. Obs. %  No. Obs. %  No. Obs. % 
Yes  1,215 41.95  2,539 46.83  7,896 61.08 
No  1,681 58.05  2,883 53.17  5,032 38.92 
          
Loan Type  No. Obs. %  No. Obs. %  No. Obs. % 
Acquisition  2 0.07  4 0.07  11 0.09 
Bridge Loan  54 1.86  127 2.34  288 2.23 
Term Loan  769 26.55  1,459 26.91  2,824 21.85 
Credit Line  1,927 66.54  3,558 65.62  8,875 68.65 
All other types  144 4.98  274 5.06  930 7.18 
          
Loan Purpose  No. Obs. %  No. Obs. %  No. Obs. % 
Acquisition  108 3.73  239 4.41  513 3.97 
Capital Expenditure  19 0.66  24 0.44  67 0.52 
Corporate Purposes  1,090 37.64  1,763 32.52  4,716 36.48 
Credit Enhancement  0 0.00  0 0.00  8 0.06 
Debt Repayment  449 15.50  815 15.03  1,755 13.58 
Takeover  280 9.67  828 15.27  1,423 11.01 
Working Capital  727 25.10  1,089 20.08  2,136 16.52 
All other purposes  223 7.70  664 12.25  2,310 17.86 
          
Credit Rating  No. Obs. %  No. Obs. %  No. Obs. % 
Unrated  1,087 37.53  1,847 34.06  4,602 35.60 
1  6 0.21  12 0.22  100 0.77 
2  6 0.21  43 0.79  323 2.50 
3  105 3.63  322 5.94  1,515 11.72 
4  344 11.88  779 14.37  2,294 17.74 
5  714 24.65  1,291 23.81  2,246 17.37 
6  634 21.89  1,128 20.80  1,848 14.29 
          
Total  2,896 100%  5,422 100%  12,928 100% 
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive statistics – Firm-specific Variables. The table reports summary 
statistics for a number of firm-specific variables for the population of loan facilities (as this is defined 
in Section 3.1, from the loans in the Dealscan database issued to firms with accounting data on 
Compustat and options data in Optionmetrics between 1996 and 2010. The Table reports statistics 
using Compustat data on firm size (natural logarithm of Total Assets - 𝐿𝑛(𝛵𝛢)), asset tangibility 
(𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝑇𝐴), leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣), profitability (𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸/𝑇𝐴), the book-to-market ratio (𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑀), and cash 
flow volatility (𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝐶𝐹𝑂/𝑇𝐴) − calculated using data from the last five years). The Table also 
reports data on short-term ATM option implied volatility στ  on day τ relative to the firm’s quarterly 
earnings announcement date (day 0), changes in short-term implied volatility,  Δσ[x,y] standing for the 
difference σx – σy, calculated for 10 and 1-day windows around the event of loan announcement, βτ or 
implied volatility term structure calculated from delta-interpolated, at-the-money options on day τ 
relative to a firm’s quarterly earnings announcement date (day 0), and Δβ[x,y] equal to the slope 
difference βx – βy calculated for 10 and 1-day windows around the event of loan announcement. The 
Table finally reports information on an information asymmetry index (IA) calculated according to 
Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) and also Leary and Roberts (2010), Gomes and Phillips (2010) and 
Chung and Zhang (2009). This index makes use of information on Analyst dispersion, Analyst 
forecast error, Bid-Ask spreads, and Stock return residual volatility, and relevant data are reported in 
a continuous form and also in rank form (in this last case on a variable basis as well as using an 
aggregate measure, IA).  All data are reported at the facility level, following Qian and Strahan (2007), 
Kim et al. (2011), and Ferreira and Matos (2012), as well as facilities announced by the firm (Panel 
A), or by any party (Panel B) and finally for all sample facilities (Panel C), following the sample 
definition described in Section 3.1. Detailed variable definitions are reported in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Loan facilities announced by firm 
Variables Q1 Mean Median Q3 St. Dev. No. 
Obs. 
       
Loan facilities announced 
by firm       
Control Variables       
𝐿𝑛(𝛵𝛢) 6.381 7.425 7.384 8.399 1.471 2,826 
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝑇𝐴 0.266 0.610 0.555 0.865 0.436 2,805 
𝐿𝑒𝑣 0.206 0.349 0.327 0.464 0.226 2,758 
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸/𝑇𝐴 -0.004 0.008 0.030 0.063 0.140 2,826 
𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑀 0.274 0.533 0.459 0.705 0.836 2,813 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝐶𝐹𝑂/𝑇𝐴) 0.020 0.047 0.034 0.057 0.045 2,822 
       
Short-term implied 
volatility        
𝜎0 0.330 0.497 0.435 0.603 0.251 2,598 
𝛥𝜎[−1,0] -0.017 -0.004 -0.002 0.011 0.129 2,591 
𝛥𝜎[−1,+1] -0.024 0.065 -0.004 0.012 2.457 2,591 
𝛥𝜎[0,+1] -0.017 0.069 -0.001 0.010 2.431 2,594 
𝛥𝜎[−10,0] -0.030 0.006 -0.001 0.033 0.129 2,580 
𝛥𝜎[−10,+10] -0.049 -0.001 -0.007 0.034 0.134 2,566 
𝛥𝜎[0,+10] -0.036 -0.007 -0.005 0.023 0.141 2,580 
       
Implied volatility term 
structure       
𝛽0 -0.090 0.047 -0.021 0.012 2.685 2,576 
𝛥𝛽[−1,0] -0.015 0.095 0.002 0.027 2.591 2,566 
𝛥𝛽[−1,+1] -0.015 -0.105 0.004 0.036 4.076 2,565 
𝛥𝛽[0,+1] -0.016 -0.123 0.001 0.025 2.837 2,570 
𝛥𝛽[−10,0] -0.041 0.092 0.000 0.041 2.775 2,557 
𝛥𝛽[−10,+10] -0.049 0.016 0.005 0.062 0.833 2,538 
𝛥𝛽[0,+10] -0.037 -0.076 0.003 0.048 2.831 2,553 
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Information asymmetry 
proxies-Level 
      
Analyst dispersion 0.010 0.060 0.030 0.060 0.115 2,255 
Analyst forecast error 0.001 0.021 0.002 0.007 0.185 2,300 
Bid-Ask spread 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.009 0.010 2,733 
Stock return residual 
volatility 0.018 0.029 0.024 0.035 0.015 2,738 
       
Information asymmetry 
proxies-Rank 
      
Analyst dispersion 1.000 2.889 3.000 4.000 1.571 2,402 
Analyst forecast error 2.000 3.208 3.000 5.000 1.413 2,499 
Bid-Ask spread 2.000 3.063 3.000 4.000 1.351 2,733 
Stock return residual 
volatility 2.000 3.111 3.000 4.000 1.310 2,738 
𝐼𝐴 2.250 3.100 3.000 3.750 1.007 2,745 
       
 
Panel B: All announced loan facilities 
Variables Q1 Mean Median Q3 St. Dev. No. 
Obs. 
       
All announced loan 
facilities 
      
Control Variables       
𝐿𝑛(𝛵𝛢) 6.559 7.625 7.536 8.669 1.484 5,227 
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝑇𝐴 0.263 0.594 0.539 0.855 0.415 5,192 
𝐿𝑒𝑣 0.219 0.360 0.341 0.469 0.230 5,101 
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸/𝑇𝐴 0.000 0.013 0.032 0.064 0.136 5,227 
𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑀 0.261 0.513 0.448 0.683 0.736 5,205 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝐶𝐹𝑂/𝑇𝐴) 0.019 0.043 0.032 0.052 0.041 5,218 
       
Short-term implied 
volatility       
𝜎0 0.322 0.487 0.427 0.584 0.265 4,901 
𝛥𝜎[−1,0] -0.016 -0.004 -0.001 0.010 0.192 4,885 
𝛥𝜎[−1,+1] -0.023 0.031 -0.003 0.012 1.800 4,883 
𝛥𝜎[0,+1] -0.015 0.035 -0.001 0.010 1.781 4,888 
𝛥𝜎[−10,0] -0.031 0.002 -0.001 0.031 0.167 4,870 
𝛥𝜎[−10,+10] -0.047 -0.004 -0.006 0.036 0.173 4,826 
𝛥𝜎[0,+10] -0.035 -0.007 -0.003 0.026 0.167 4,846 
       
Implied volatility term 
structure       
𝛽0 -0.090 0.013 -0.025 0.011 2.050 4,846 
𝛥𝛽[−1,0] -0.016 0.073 0.001 0.025 1.983 4,826 
𝛥𝛽[−1,+1] -0.020 -0.042 0.003 0.034 3.023 4,819 
𝛥𝛽[0,+1] -0.017 -0.075 0.001 0.023 2.165 4,828 
𝛥𝛽[−10,0] -0.041 0.049 0.000 0.044 2.350 4,813 
𝛥𝛽[−10,+10] -0.046 0.012 0.005 0.061 1.276 4,762 
𝛥𝛽[0,+10] -0.036 -0.037 0.002 0.046 2.160 4,784 
       
Information asymmetry 
proxies-Level       
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Analyst dispersion 0.010 0.063 0.030 0.060 0.119 4,172 
Analyst forecast error 0.001 0.058 0.002 0.006 1.238 4,239 
Bid-Ask spread 0.001 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.011 5,111 
Stock return residual 
volatility 0.018 0.028 0.024 0.034 0.014 5,125 
       
Information asymmetry 
proxies-Rank       
Analyst dispersion 1.000 2.920 3.000 4.000 1.578 4,479 
Analyst forecast error 2.000 3.131 3.000 4.000 1.406 4,615 
Bid-Ask spread 2.000 2.922 3.000 4.000 1.351 5,111 
Stock return residual 
volatility 2.000 2.949 3.000 4.000 1.322 5,125 
𝐼𝐴 2.250 2.997 3.000 3.750 0.999 5,142 
       
 
Panel C: All loan facilities 
Variables Q1 Mean Median Q3 St. Dev. No. 
Obs. 
       
All loan facilities       
Control variables       
𝐿𝑛(𝛵𝛢) 6.675 7.815 7.717 8.991 1.610 12,480 
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝑇𝐴 0.277 0.597 0.538 0.853 0.400 12,407 
𝐿𝑒𝑣 0.197 0.336 0.317 0.437 0.220 12,095 
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸/𝑇𝐴 0.008 0.022 0.038 0.073 0.141 12,475 
𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑀 0.247 0.481 0.418 0.640 0.664 12,441 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝐶𝐹𝑂/𝑇𝐴) 0.018 0.042 0.031 0.052 0.043 12,450 
       
Information asymmetry 
proxies-Level       
Analyst dispersion 0.010 0.067 0.030 0.060 0.319 9,894 
Analyst forecast error 0.001 0.130 0.002 0.005 9.613 9,995 
Bid-Ask spread 0.001 0.008 0.004 0.012 0.010 12,260 
Stock return residual 
volatility 0.017 0.027 0.023 0.033 0.015 12,291 
       
Information asymmetry 
proxies-Rank       
Analyst dispersion 1.000 2.891 3.000 4.000 1.583 3.000 
Analyst forecast error 2.000 2.983 3.000 4.000 1.409 3.000 
Bid-Ask spread 2.000 2.693 3.000 4.000 1.325 3.000 
Stock return residual 
volatility 2.000 2.711 3.000 4.000 1.366 3.000 
𝐼𝐴 2.000 2.827 2.750 3.500 0.998 2.750 
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Table 3: Portfolio Analysis – Mean and Median IV and TSIV Values around Loan Announcements. The Table reports means and medians of 
at-the-money, short-term implied volatility levels σ0, and also term structure of implied volatility levels β0 on the loan announcement day (day 0) for 
all announcement over 1996-2010. The Table further reports means and medians of at-the-money, short-term implied volatility changes Δσ[x,y] = σx – 
σy, and of changes in term structure of implied volatility Δβ[x,y] = βx – βy over trading day intervals [x,y] relative to the sample firms’ loan 
announcement date (day 0) during the same period. Implied volatility (IV) is calculated by ‘delta-interpolating’ between the implied volatility of the 
closest-to-the money call and put options available on day τ. Variable βτ  stands for slope of the term structure of implied volatility, with term 
structure calculated from at-the-money options with expiries ranging from 30 up to 730 days in cases. In Panel A, we report means and medians of 
volatility metrics for loans announced by the firms themselves, while in Panel B, we repeat our analysis for loan announcements made by any party. 
The calculation of short-term IV and the term structure of IV is described in Section 3.2.  An *, **, *** indicates that the null is rejected at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level respectively. An †, †† and ††† indicates that a z-test for the median (Wilcoxon signed rank test) is statistically 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
Panel A: Loans announced by firm 
 
Window around the loan 
announcement day 
 
Announcement 
day 
(Day 0) 
[-10,+10] [-10,0] [0,+10] [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] 
        
Loans announced by firm        
        
Short-term IV, σ        
Average  0.4974*** -0.0013 0.0056** -0.0073*** 0.0647 -0.0043* 0.0689 
t-stat 100.85 -0.50 2.22 -2.63 1.34 -1.69 1.44 
        
Median 0.4350††† -0.0066††† 0.0014† -0.0049††† -0.0041††† -0.0022††† -0.0015††† 
z-val 44.15 -5.06 1.76 -6.02 -8.76 -5.58 -5.25 
        
N 2,598 2,566 2,580 2,580 2,591 2,591 2,594 
        
Term structure of IV, β        
Average  0.0473 0.0160 0.0922* -0.0759 -0.1053 0.0948* 0.0373 
t-stat 0.89 0.97 1.68 -1.35 -1.31 1.85 1.42 
        
Median -0.0212††† 0.0048††† -0.0003 0.0033††† 0.0036††† 0.0024††† 0.0014††† 
z-val -18.81 3.41 0.06 3.61 7.98 5.72 3.98 
        
N 2,576 2,538 2,557 2,553 2,565 2,566 2,570 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: All announced loans 
 
 
Window around the loan 
announcement day 
 
Announcement 
day 
(Day 0) 
[-10,+10] [-10,0] [0,+10] [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] 
        
All announced loans        
        
Short-term IV, σ        
Average  0.4873*** -0.0040* 0.0021 -0.0066*** 0.0306 -0.0043 0.0349 
t-stat 128.84 1.69 0.89 -2.74 1.19 -1.57 1.37 
        
Median 0.4269††† -0.0060††† -0.0014 -0.0034††† -0.0031††† -0.0012††† -0.0013††† 
z-val 60.63 -5.70 -0.77 -5.82 -10.21 -5.80 -6.36 
        
N 4,901 4,826 4,870 4,846 4,883 4,885 4,888 
        
Term structure of IV, β        
Average  0.0127 0.0120 0.0494 -0.0369 -0.0418 0.0726** 0.0063 
t-stat 0.43 0.65 1.46 -1.18 -0.96 2.54 0.60 
        
Median -0.0251††† 0.0046††† -0.0001 0.0025††† 0.0027††† 0.0015††† 0.0011††† 
z-val -27.25 4.97 0.29 4.22 7.74 5.51 3.84 
        
N 4,846 4,762 4,813 4,784 4,819 4,826 4,828 
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Table 4: Mean and Median IV and TSIV Values around Loan Announcements according Loan 
Characteristics. The Table reports portfolio means of at-the-money, 30-day implied volatility levels στ, 
and changes Δσ[x,y] = σx – σy, and also term structure of implied volatility levels βτ and changes Δβ[x,y] = βx 
– βy on day τ (for levels) or over trading day intervals [x,y] relative to the sample firms’ loan 
announcement date (day 0) for all announced loans during 1996-2010, according to different loan 
characteristics. Implied volatility (IV) is calculated by ‘delta-interpolating’ between the implied volatility 
of the closest-to-the money x-day call and put options available on day τ. Variable βτ  stands for slope of 
the term structure of implied volatility, with term structure calculated from at-the-money options with 
expiries ranging from 30 up to 730 days in cases. Results in this Table have been calculated (where 
applicable) for all loans that have been announced by any party – by the firm or any other party. In Panel 
A, we separate loan facilities depending on whether they have been announced by the firm itself or by 
any party other than the firm, according to credit rating (investment grade vs. speculative grade or 
unrated senior debt), maturity (shorter or longer than two years), spread size (lower/higher than 150 basis 
points (bp)). In Panel B, we separate loan facilities according to  firm information asymmetry, using the 
methodology proposed by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011a) for information asymmetry levels, from 
lowest (1) to highest (4). An *, **, *** indicates that the null is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. There have been also calculated differences between means of facility 
portfolios depending on the criterion for portfolio formation each time, and an #, ##, ### indicates that 
the null hypothesis that means between portfolios of firms are equal is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. Detailed variable definitions are reported in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Option market reaction depending on different loan characteristics 
 
Announced  
by firm 
 
Announced by all 
others 
   Diff.   
 (1)  (2)    (2)-(1)   
𝜎0 0.4974***  0.4758***    -0.0217###   
𝛥𝜎[−10,+10] -0.0013  -0.0071    -0.0057   
𝛥𝜎[−10,0] 0.0056**  -0.0018    -0.0075   
𝛥𝜎[0,+10] -0.0073***  -0.0058    0.0015   
𝛥𝜎[−1,+1] 0.0647  -0.0079    -0.0725   
𝛽0 0.0473  -0.0267    -0.0740   
𝛥𝛽[−10,+10] 0.0160  0.0075    -0.0085   
𝛥𝛽[−10,0] 0.0922*  0.0009    -0.0913   
𝛥𝛽[0,+10] -0.0759  0.0076    0.0835   
𝛥𝛽[−1,+1] -0.1053  -4.1570*    -4.0516#   
          
 
Rating: 1-4 
Investment Grade 
 
Rating: 5-6 
Speculative Grade 
 Unrated  Diff. Diff. Diff. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (3)-(2) 
𝜎0 0.3761***  0.4941***  0.5536***  0.1180### 0.1775### 0.0595### 
𝛥𝜎[−10,+10] -0.0017  -0.0027  -0.0074*  -0.0010 -0.0056 -0.0047 
𝛥𝜎[−10,0] 0.0084  -0.0027  0.0044  -0.0111# -0.0040 0.0071 
𝛥𝜎[0,+10] -0.0103  -0.0005  -0.0122***  0.0097 -0.0019 -0.0117## 
𝛥𝜎[−1,+1] 0.1619  -0.0106**  -0.0032  -0.1725## -0.1651# 0.0074 
𝛽0 0.2204***  -0.0231  -0.0824***  -0.2435### -0.3028### -0.0593### 
𝛥𝛽[−10,+10] -0.0742  0.0291*  0.0491**  0.1033## 0.1233## 0.0199 
𝛥𝛽[−10,0] 0.1983  0.0247  -0.0208  -0.1735# -0.2190# -0.0455## 
𝛥𝛽[0,+10] -0.2706**  0.0033  0.0707***  0.2740### 0.3413### 0.0673## 
𝛥𝛽[−1,+1] -0.2316  0.0084  -5.9678*  0.2400# -5.7362# -5.9762## 
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Maturity 
At most 2 years 
 
Maturity 
More than 2 years 
   Diff.   
 (1)  (2)    (2)-(1)   
𝜎0 0.4928***  0.4827***    -0.0101   
𝛥𝜎[−10,+10] 0.0034  -0.0065**    -0.0099#   
𝛥𝜎[−10,0] 0.0068  -0.0002    -0.0070   
𝛥𝜎[0,+10] -0.0033  -0.0068**    -0.0034   
𝛥𝜎[−1,+1] -0.0225***  0.0431    0.0655##   
𝛽0 -0.0415*  0.0304    0.0720#   
𝛥𝛽[−10,+10] -0.0399  0.0248    0.0647   
𝛥𝛽[−10,0] -0.0303  0.0723*    0.1026   
𝛥𝛽[0,+10] -0.0096  -0.0474    -0.0379   
𝛥𝛽[−1,+1] 0.0521  -2.5100*    -2.5621#   
          
 
Loan spread 
At most 150 bp 
 
Loan spread 
More than 150 bp 
   Diff.   
 (1)  (2)    (2)-(1)   
𝜎0 0.4061***  0.5382***    0.1321###   
𝛥𝜎[−10,+10] -0.0040  -0.0037    0.0003   
𝛥𝜎[−10,0] 0.0062  -0.0003    -0.0066   
𝛥𝜎[0,+10] -0.0102**  -0.0039    0.0063   
𝛥𝜎[−1,+1] 0.1005  -0.0117***    -0.1122#   
𝛽0 0.1078  -0.0386***    -0.1464##   
𝛥𝛽[−10,+10] -0.0186  0.0297*    0.0484   
𝛥𝛽[−10,0] 0.1055  0.0178    -0.0877   
𝛥𝛽[0,+10] -0.1221  0.0118    0.1339#   
𝛥𝛽[−1,+1] -0.1360  -3.6615*    -3.5255#   
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Panel B: Option market reaction depending on different levels of firm information asymmetry 
 Info Asymmetry 
𝐼𝐴 ≤ 2 
 Info Asymmetry 
2 < 𝐼𝐴 ≤ 3 
 Info Asymmetry 
3 < 𝐼𝐴 ≤ 4 
 Info Asymmetry 
𝐼𝐴 > 4 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
𝜎0 0.3600***  0.4416***  0.5295***  0.6956*** 
𝛥𝜎[−10,+10] -0.0099  -0.0003  -0.0012  -0.0113 
𝛥𝜎[−10,0] -0.0114*  0.0062*  0.0007  0.0041 
𝛥𝜎[0,+10] 0.0019  -0.0065**  -0.0020  -0.0165*** 
𝛥𝜎[−1,+1] -0.0198  -0.0066***  0.0769  0.0037 
𝛽0 0.2634**  -0.0764***  -0.0282*  -0.0358 
𝛥𝛽[−10,+10] -0.1202*  0.0459**  0.0543*  0.0350*** 
𝛥𝛽[−10,0] 0.1725  -0.0030  0.0321*  0.0663** 
𝛥𝛽[0,+10] -0.2940**  0.0488***  0.0224  -0.0294 
𝛥𝛽[−1,+1] 0.0589**  0.0368**  -0.1312  -0.0179 
        
 
 Diff.  Diff.  Diff.  Diff.  Diff.  Diff. 
 (2)-(1)  (3)-(1)  (4)-(1)  (3)-(2)  (4)-(2)  (4)-(3) 
𝜎0 0.0817###  0.1695###  0.3356###  0.0878###  0.2540###  0.1662### 
𝛥𝜎[−10,+10] 0.0096  0.0087  -0.0015  -0.0009  -0.0110  -0.0101 
𝛥𝜎[−10,0] 0.0176###  0.0121#  0.0155#  -0.0055  -0.0020  0.0034 
𝛥𝜎[0,+10] -0.0085  -0.0039  -0.0184##  0.0046  -0.0100  -0.0146# 
𝛥𝜎[−1,+1] 0.0132  0.0967  0.0235  0.0835  0.0103  -0.0732 
𝛽0 -0.3398###  -0.2915##  -0.2992##  0.0483##  0.0406  -0.0076 
𝛥𝛽[−10,+10] 0.1662###  0.1745##  0.1553##  0.0083  -0.0109  -0.0192 
𝛥𝛽[−10,0] -0.1755  -0.1404  -0.1062  0.0351  0.0693#  0.0342 
𝛥𝛽[0,+10] 0.3429###  0.3164##  0.2647#  -0.0265  -0.0782###  -0.0517 
𝛥𝛽[−1,+1] -0.0221  -0.1901  -0.0768##  -0.1680  -0.0547  0.1133 
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Table 5: Option Market Reaction to Loan Announcements: Regression Analysis for Short-Term IV. In 
Panel A, the Table reports estimation results of the following probit model that constitutes the selection 
equation of the Heckman (1979) procedure: 
𝑃𝑟[𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 1] = 𝛷(𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾6,𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡𝜸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) 
The variable 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan facility 𝑖 in year 𝑡 was 
announced by the firm itself, and zero if the firm did not make such an announcement. Operators 𝑃𝑟[. ] and 
𝛷(. ) denote probability and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
respectively. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix A. The marginal effect is calculated as the 
change in 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?) when the variable in question in the vector of independent variables 𝒛𝑖,𝑡 changes by one, and 
all other variables are set at their mean values (all year indicators are set to zero in the marginal effects 
calculations). 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿 denotes the maximised log-likelihood and LR 𝜒2 stat. is the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 
test under the null hypothesis that at least one of the independent variables’ coefficients is not equal to zero, 
and the test’s p-value appears in square brackets. 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2 is McFadden’s measure of goodness of fit, 
computed as 1 − 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿/𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐, where 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐 denotes the (constrained) log-likelihood of a model with an 
intercept only. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate coefficient statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
Panel A: Heckman (1979) selection equation estimation results for short-term IV (σ) 
  Pred. Sign  Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal effect 
         
Intercept    -1.3291***  -12.20   
         
𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡  +  0.1791***  7.02  0.0612 
         
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑖/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  +  1.4512***  9.17  0.4957 
         
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡  +  0.1798***  3.37  0.0614 
         
Year Indicators    Yes     
         
LR 𝜒2 stat. 
 
 
 805.14### 
[0.000] 
 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2  0.0743 
No. Obs.    11,359  𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿  -5,015.72 
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In Panel B, the Table reports estimation results of the following equation that constitutes the 
response equation of the Heckman (1979) procedure: 
{𝜎𝑖,𝜏, 𝛥𝜎[𝜏1,𝜏2]} =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼2,𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛼3,𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑙,𝑖
𝑙
+ 𝛼4𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼5,𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑘
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The dependent variables 𝜎𝜏 and 𝛥𝜎(𝑥,𝑦) are respectively short-term ATM option implied volatility 
στ  on day τ relative to the firm’s loan announcement date (day 0), and the change in short-term 
implied volatility, Δσ[x,y] standing for the difference σx – σy, calculated for 10-day windows around 
the event of loan announcement. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix A.  𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
is the inverse of Mill’s ratio (the non-selection hazard rate) from the first stage of the Heckman 
(1979) procedure, calculated as 𝜑(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?) 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?)⁄ , with 𝜑(. ) the density and 𝛷(. ) the cumulative 
density function of the standard normal distribution. z-statistic values are reported in parentheses, 
and asterisks *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. The Wald 𝜒2 statistic is a Wald test that all coefficients in the regression model 
(except the constant) are all equal to zero (and its p-value is reported in square brackets). 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿 
denotes the maximized log-likelihood and 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2 is McFadden’s measure of goodness of fit, 
computed as 1 − 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿/𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐, where 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐 denotes the (constrained) log-likelihood of a model 
with an intercept only. 
Panel B: Estimation results for short-term IV – response equation of Heckman (1979) model 
Coefficients / Dependent Var.  𝜎𝑖,0  𝛥𝜎𝑖,[−10,+10]  𝛥𝜎𝑖,[−10,0]  𝛥𝜎𝑖,[0,+10] 
         
Intercept  0.5150*** 
(3.55) 
 -0.2825*** 
(-3.14) 
 -0.1856** 
(-2.53) 
 -0.3345*** 
(-3.35) 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,0 
 0.9821*** 
(10.44) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑛([𝑉𝐼𝑋[𝑥,𝑦]]) 
 
 
 0.7733*** 
(10.14) 
 0.7046*** 
(8.28) 
 0.6857*** 
(9.86) 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 -0.1477*** 
(-9.31) 
 0.1657*** 
(7.28) 
 0.1164*** 
(7.34) 
 0.1314*** 
(6.42) 
Firm-specific control variables 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
 0.0116 
(1.33) 
 -0.0202*** 
(-3.53) 
 -0.0112*** 
(-2.93) 
 -0.0183*** 
(-4.06) 
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 -0.0251* 
(-1.94) 
 0.0051 
(0.61) 
 -0.0026 
(-0.38) 
 0.0098* 
(1.75) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
 0.0177 
(0.55) 
 0.0406** 
(2.36) 
 0.0026 
(0.16) 
 0.0467*** 
(2.77) 
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 -0.3712*** 
(-5.73) 
 -0.0308 
(-0.85) 
 -0.0551 
(-1.63) 
 0.0371 
(1.03) 
𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
 -0.0009 
(-0.56) 
 -0.0011 
(-0.13) 
 -0.0075 
(-1.18) 
 0.0101** 
(2.24) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
 0.5106*** 
(2.82) 
 0.2633*** 
(3.35) 
 0.1505** 
(2.29) 
 0.1205* 
(1.67) 
Loan-specific variables 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖 
 0.0253** 
(2.35) 
 -0.0051 
(-0.71) 
 -0.0029 
(-0.47) 
 0.0040 
(0.61) 
𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖) 
 -0.0202*** 
(-2.94) 
 0.0085* 
(1.86) 
 0.0033 
(1.02) 
 0.0039 
(1.08) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) 
 -0.0313** 
(-2.51) 
 -0.0097 
(-1.40) 
 0.0034 
(0.68) 
 -0.0178** 
(-2.48) 
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𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑖) 
 -0.0231*** 
(-3.23) 
 0.0124** 
(2.55) 
 0.0064* 
(1.89) 
 0.0172*** 
(3.36) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖) 
 0.0623*** 
(5.66) 
 0.0071 
(0.88) 
 0.0041 
(0.65) 
 0.0033 
(0.60) 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 
 -0.0046* 
(-1.71) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.09) 
 0.0002 
(0.12) 
 0.0002 
(0.16) 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 
 0.0011** 
(1.97) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.83) 
 -0.0005* 
(-1.69) 
 0.0004 
(1.02) 
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖 
 -0.0000 
(-0.11) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.74) 
 0.0000 
(0.27) 
 -0.0002 
(-1.31) 
Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Wald 𝜒2 stat. 
 968.86### 
[0.000] 
 214.95### 
[0.000] 
 140.11### 
[0.000] 
 192.22### 
[0.000] 
         
No. Obs.  2,087  2,062  2,066  2,070 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2  0.2398  0.1278  0.1224  0.1134 
LogL  -4,130.4  -3,360.7  -2,949.3  -3,176.7 
         
Variance-Inflation-Factor 
(VIF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡  5.3937  9.4251  9.5238  9.7752 
47 
 
Table 6: Option Market Reaction to Loan Announcements: Regression Analysis for TSIV. In 
Panel A, the Table reports estimation results of the following probit model that constitutes the 
selection equation of the Heckman (1979) procedure: 
𝑃𝑟[𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 1] = 𝛷(𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾6,𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
= 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡𝜸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) 
The variable 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan facility 𝑖 in year 
𝑡 was announced by the firm itself, and zero if the firm did not make such an announcement. 
Operators 𝑃𝑟[. ] and 𝛷(. ) denote probability and the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution respectively. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
The marginal effect is calculated as the change in 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?) when the variable in question in the 
vector of independent variables 𝒛𝑖,𝑡 changes by one, and all other variables are set at their mean 
values (all year indicators are set to zero in the marginal effects calculations). 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿 denotes the 
maximised log-likelihood and LR 𝜒2 stat. is the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square test under the null 
hypothesis that at least one of the independent variables’ coefficients is not equal to zero, and the 
test’s p-value appears in square brackets. 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2 is McFadden’s measure of goodness of fit, 
computed as 1 − 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿/𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐, where 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐 denotes the (constrained) log-likelihood of a model 
with an intercept only. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate coefficient statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Panel A: Heckman (1979) selection equation estimation results for TSIV (β) 
  Pred. Sign  Coefficient  z-statistic  Marginal effect 
         
Intercept    -0.9188***  -13.56   
         
𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡  +  0.0175**  2.12  0.0053 
         
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑖/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  +  0.8423***  4.57  0.2550 
         
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡  +  0.0181  1.61  0.0055 
         
Year Indicators    Yes     
         
LR 𝜒2 stat. 
 
 
 801.62### 
[0.000] 
 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2  0.0744 
No. Obs.    11,342  𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿  -4,988.62 
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In  Panel B, the Table reports estimation results of the following equation that that constitutes the response 
equation of the Heckman (1979) procedure:  
{𝛽𝑖,𝜏, 𝛥𝛽[𝜏1,𝜏2]} =   𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼2,𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛼3,𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑙,𝑖
𝑙
+ 𝛼4𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼5,𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑘
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The dependent variables 𝛽𝜏 and 𝛥𝛽(𝑥,𝑦) are respectively the implied volatility term structure βτ, calculated from 
delta-interpolated, at-the-money options on day τ relative to a firm’s loan announcement date (day 0), and the 
change in term structure Δβ[x,y] equal to the slope difference βx – βy, calculated for 10-day windows around the 
event of the loan announcement. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the inverse of 
Mill’s ratio (the non-selection hazard rate) from the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure, calculated as 
𝜑(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?) 𝛷(𝒛𝑖,𝑡?̂?)⁄ , with 𝜑(. ) the density and 𝛷(. ) the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution. z-statistic values are reported in parentheses, and asterisks *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The Wald 𝜒2 statistic is a Wald test that all coefficients in 
the regression model (except the constant) are all equal to zero (and its p-value is reported in square brackets). 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿 denotes the maximized log-likelihood and 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2 is McFadden’s measure of goodness of fit, 
computed as 1 − 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿/𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐, where 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑐 denotes the (constrained) log-likelihood of a model with an 
intercept only. 
 
Panel B: Estimation results for TSIV – response equation of Heckman (1979) model 
Coefficients / Dependent Var.  𝛽𝑖,0  𝛥𝛽𝑖,[−10,+10]  𝛥𝛽𝑖,[−10,0]  𝛥𝛽𝑖,[0,+10] 
         
Intercept  -5.9748*** 
(-3.49) 
 -0.4314 
(-1.43) 
 -6.4197*** 
(-4.25) 
 8.7333*** 
(3.536) 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,0 
 -0.6801*** 
(-5.20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑛([𝑉𝐼𝑋[𝑥,𝑦]]) 
 
 
 -0.4739*** 
(-2.71) 
 -0.2324 
(-1.01) 
 -0.4334 
(-1.12) 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
 3.3743*** 
(2.81) 
 -0.0684* 
(-1.71) 
 3.5553** 
(2.57) 
 -3.9072*** 
(-3.06) 
Firm-specific control variables 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
 -0.2239*** 
(-3.33) 
 -0.0049 
(-0.23) 
 -0.2189*** 
(-3.93) 
 0.3743*** 
(3.28) 
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 0.1031** 
(2.31) 
 0.0568 
(1.05) 
 0.1165*** 
(4.64) 
 -0.0199 
(-0.23) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
 0.0424 
(0.64) 
 -0.0396 
(-0.71) 
 -0.0132 
(-0.14) 
 -0.2960 
(-1.62) 
𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 -0.0720 
(-0.84) 
 -0.0049 
(-0.07) 
 0.0523 
(0.26) 
 0.2911* 
(1.78) 
𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑀𝑖,𝑡 
 -0.0453 
(-1.29) 
 -0.0024 
(-0.22) 
 -0.0411*** 
(-2.72) 
 0.0027 
(0.10) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
 0.3367 
(1.46) 
 -0.2963* 
(-1.78) 
 0.2277 
(1.08) 
 -1.0011** 
(-2.44) 
Loan-specific variables 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖 
 0.1153** 
(2.16) 
 0.0560 
(1.52) 
 0.1295* 
(1.93) 
 0.0008 
(0.01) 
𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖) 
 -0.0306 
(-1.56) 
 0.0053 
(0.27) 
 -0.0413*** 
(-2.80) 
 0.0773* 
(1.81) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) 
 -0.0179 
(-0.71) 
 0.0231 
(1.26) 
 -0.0037 
(-0.25) 
 0.0445 
(1.21) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑖) 
 0.2540*** 
(3.72) 
 0.0126 
(0.77) 
 0.2476*** 
(4.97) 
 -0.3930*** 
(-3.39) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖) 
 -0.0480 
(-1.22) 
 0.0244 
(0.80) 
 -0.0113 
(-0.48) 
 0.0010 
(0.02) 
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𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 
 0.0021 
(0.36) 
 -0.0121 
(-1.06) 
 -0.0096* 
(-1.86) 
 -0.0129 
(-0.75) 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 
 0.0005 
(0.45) 
 -0.0005 
(-0.48) 
 0.0003 
(0.45) 
 -0.0029 
(-1.07) 
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖 
 0.0003 
(0.30) 
 -0.0011 
(-0.86) 
 0.0005 
(0.68) 
 -0.0022 
(-1.06) 
  Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Wald 𝜒2 stat. 
 54.36### 
[0.003] 
 58.51### 
[0.001] 
 86.59### 
[0.000] 
 86.14### 
[0.000] 
         
No. Obs.  2,070  2,040  2,048  2,049 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2  0.1183  0.1337  0.1499  0.1237 
LogL  -8,270.8  -7,309.1  -8,358.7  -9,172.3 
         
Variance-Inflation-Factor 
(VIF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡  4.2985  9.0253  4.2299  2.3626 
 
50 
 
Table 7: Trading results for an options strategy based on the term structure of implied volatility following firm loan announcements under no transaction costs The Table 
reports the sum, the mean and the median profits and losses of two trading strategies (strategies A and B) outlined in Section 4. In Panel A (B) the results of strategy A (B) are 
summarized. Strategy A is as follows: On the day a new loan facility is announced by a firm, we invest $500 by going long at-the-money straddles on its stock with the longest 
expiry available. This investment is financed by selling (shorting), on the same day, the necessary number of at-the-money straddles with the short-term expiry (30 days). The 
position is maintained for 10 trading days, and then closed. Strategy B is identical to A, only trades are implemented only the day following the loan facility announcement day. An 
*, ** and *** (respectively †, †† and †††) indicates a statistically greater from zero mean (median) at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Panel A: Trading profits and losses under no transaction costs (Strategy A) 
Trading Profits under  Strategy leg: Short position  Strategy leg: Long position  Strategy: Long and Short, [0, +10] 
No transaction costs  Profits ($) % of profitable trades  Profits ($) % of profitable trades  Profits ($) % of profitable trades 
           
Pooled: Sum  1,762.01 53.04% of 2,541 trades  19,310.42 47.71% of 2,541 trades  21,072.43 53.12% of 2,541 trades 
 Min  -1,440.77   -567.86   -1,115.28  
 Max  749.35   1,715.90   1,827.15  
           
 Mean  0.70   7.63***   8.32***  
 t-stat  (0.22)   (2.80)   (2.69)  
           
 Median  8.31†††   3.14†††   5.50†††  
 z-val  [2.56]   [2.10]   [3.30]  
 
Panel B: Trading profits and losses under no transaction costs for a strategy that starts on the day following the loan announcement day (Strategy B) 
Trading Profits under  Strategy leg: Short position  Strategy leg: Long position  Strategy: Long and Short, [+1, +10] 
No transaction costs  Profits ($) % of profitable trades  Profits ($) % of profitable trades  Profits ($) % of profitable trades 
           
Pooled: Sum  -8,164.68 49.94% of 2,541 trades  40,930.21 48.68% of 2,541 trades  32,765.53 50.61% of 2,541 trades 
 Min  -2,112.58   -950.62   -1,470.01  
 Max  896.60   2,783.14   3,243.94  
           
 Mean  -3.21   16.11***   12.89***  
 t-stat  (-0.94)   (3.63)   (2.77)  
           
 Median  1.06   -1.72   0.00  
 z-val  [0.70]   [-0.06]   [0.40]  
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Table 8 Trading results for an options strategy based on the term structure of implied volatility following firm loan announcements when transaction costs are imposed 
The Table reports the sum, the mean and the median profits and losses of two trading strategies (strategies A and B) outlined in Section 4. In Panel A (B) the results of strategy A 
(B) are summarized. Strategy A is as follows: On the day a new loan facility is announced by a firm, we invest $500 by going long at-the-money straddles on its stock with the 
longest expiry available. This investment is financed by selling (shorting), on the same day, the necessary number of at-the-money straddles with the short-term expiry (30 days). 
The position is maintained for 10 trading days, and then closed. Strategy B is identical to A, only trades are implemented only the day following the loan facility announcement 
day. Transaction costs are as described in Section 4. An *, ** and *** (respectively †, †† and †††) indicates a statistically greater from zero mean (median) at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
Panel A: Trading profits and losses with transaction costs (Strategy A) 
Trading Profits with  Strategy leg: Short position  Strategy leg: Long position  Strategy: Long and Short, [0, +10] 
transaction costs  Profits ($) % of profitable trades  Profits ($) % of profitable trades  Profits ($) % of profitable trades 
           
Pooled: Sum  -136.49 52.80%  of 2,541 trades  17,435.92 47.27%  of 2,541 trades  17,299.43 52.41% of 2,541 trades 
 Min  -1,441.52   -568.36   -1,116.78  
 Max  748.60   1,715.15   1,825.65  
           
 Mean  -0.05   6.89***   6.83**  
 t-stat  (-0.02)   (2.53)   (2.21)  
           
 Median  7.56††   2.58†   4.00†††  
 z-val  [2.26]   [1.53]   [2.59]  
Panel B: Trading profits and losses with transaction costs for a strategy that starts on the day following the loan announcement day (Strategy B) 
Trading Profits with  Strategy leg: Short position  Strategy leg: Long position  Strategy: Long and Short, [+1, +10] 
transaction costs  Profits ($) % of profitable trades  Profits ($) % of profitable trades  Profits ($) % of profitable trades 
           
Pooled: Sum  -10,070.43 50.10% of 2,541 trades  39,048.71 48.41% of 2,541 trades  28,978.28 48.96% of 2,541 trades 
 Min  -2,113.33   -951.12   -1,471.51  
 Max  895.85   2,782.39   3,242.44  
           
 Mean  -3.96   15.37***   11.40***  
 t-stat  (-1.16)   (3.47)   (2.45)  
           
 Median  0.31   -2.47   -1.48  
 z-val  [0.40]   [-0.49]   [-0.31]  
 
